Spreading the use of responsive adjustment mechanisms

for renewable energy deployment policies: An agent-based

modelling cross-country evaluation by Rottmann, Fabian
  
 
 
MASTER THESIS 
 
Spreading the use of responsive adjustment mechanisms 
for renewable energy deployment policies: An agent-based 
modelling cross-country evaluation 
 
Spring Semester 2018 
 
Fabian Rottmann 
 
Prof. Dr. Robert Pitz-Paala 
Prof. Dr. Volker Hoffmannb 
 
Supervisors: 
Pascal Kuhnc, PhD 
Alejandro Núñez Jiménezb, PhD  
Dr. Christof Knoerib 
 
 
The present work was submitted on 5 September 2018 to 
DLR – Institute of Solar Research, Chair of Solar Technology, RWTH Aachen University 
 
DLR - Institute of Solar Researchc & Chair of Solar Technologya 
RWTH Aachen University 
Group for Sustainability and Technology,  
Department of Management, Technology and Economicsb 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH) 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Alejandro Núñez Jiménez and Christof 
Knoeri for the continuous support on this project. Thanks for your guidance and valuable 
feedback throughout the whole time. Additionally, I want to thank the whole SusTec team and 
in particular my friends from the Master Students’ room. I appreciate your interest in my work 
and your support throughout the development of this project. Thanks to Pascal Kuhn for his 
valuable feedback and thanks to professors Volker Hoffmann and Robert Pitz-Paal for 
supervising this Master Thesis. 
Most importantly, I want to thank my family, who has always supported me in all my projects, 
no matter how far that would take me from them. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
Abstract 
Deployment policies proved to effectively stimulate the diffusion of renewable energies. Yet, 
the adjustment of incentives to evolving technology costs remains a challenge. A previous 
study suggested novel policy designs, which automatically adjust the incentives based on 
control theory principles, to produce a more effective and cost-efficient feed-in tariff for 
photovoltaics (PV) than the historical policy in Germany. However, policy transfer between 
countries sometimes leads to policy failure. Thus, the reproducibility of the suggested 
achievements in jurisdictions comprising different economic, social or environmental contexts 
remains unclear. Especially for technologies such as solar PV, the transfer of deployment 
policies from one country to another could be particularly risky. They often combine rapidly 
evolving technology costs, influenced by global and local learning rates, and an attractiveness 
heavily influenced by local factors, such as irradiation. This study assesses if the new 
mechanisms can repeat the improvements upon historical policies in Switzerland and Spain. 
Therefore, it employs an agent-based model of the socio-technical system for solar PV in each 
country. The results state that the analyzed design can reliably achieve a higher deployment 
with significantly lower costs per installed capacity than the simulated historical policies in each 
country. It can curb, yet not fully avoid the historically occurred boom and bust cycles in Spain. 
The results show that different overall deployment targets as well as different initial incentive 
levels do not compromise the policy’s cost efficiency when using the new suggested policy 
design. However, they stress that a later deployment generally allows for higher cost-efficient 
policies. The novel policy design could offer policy makers a reliable new tool for designing 
future deployment policies under different conditions that effectively accelerate the diffusion of 
technologies to mitigate climate change without becoming too costly. As it becomes less critical 
to decide upon the right initial level of incentives or a suitable target for overall deployment, the 
novel design could encourage governments to apply deployment policies in the future. 
Keywords: Renewable energy policy, responsive incentive adjustments, agent-based model, 
solar photovoltaics, feed-in tariff. 
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II List of Acronyms 
Abbreviation Description 
PV 
Photovoltaics is a term that generally covers the conversion of light into electricity but 
often is used to refer to a power system that supplies solar power by means of 
photovoltaics. 
Wp 
Watt peak is a measure unit of electrical power that refers to the nominal power output 
of a photovoltaic device under standard test conditions. 
kWh Kilowatt hour is a measure unit of energy often used for electricity. 
GHI 
Global horizontal irradiation is the total (sum of direct and diffuse) irradiance coming 
from the sun on a horizontal surface on earth. 
FITs 
Feed-in tariffs constitute financial incentives offered by policy makers to renewable 
energy producers that normally include a long-term contract that pays a fixed and 
above-market price per unit of energy. 
MKF 
Additional costs financing (German: Mehrkostenfinanzierung) is the feed-in 
remuneration policy for renewable energies in Switzerland that came into force in 
January 2005 and was replaced by the KEV in January 2009. 
KEV 
Feed-in remuneration at cost (German: Kostendeckende Einspeisevergütung) is the 
feed-in remuneration policy for renewable energies in Switzerland that came into force 
in January 2009. 
EIV 
One-time investment subsidy (German: Einmalvergütung) constitutes an alternative to 
the KEV in Switzerland since 2014 that pays renewable energy producers a one-time 
subsidy for building a renewable energy system. 
GDP 
Gross domestic product is the monetary value of all final goods and services produced 
in a specific time within the borders of a country. 
NPV 
Net present value is the current value of a future difference in cash inflows and cash 
outflows for a given discount rate over a period of time. 
IRR 
Internal rate of return describes the discount rate that makes the NPV to zero. In this 
thesis, this refers to the average NPV of an investment in a PV system by households. 
EUR Euro is the official currency of the European Union. 
CHF Swiss franc (German: Schweizer Franken) is the official currency of Switzerland. 
ABM 
Agent-based models enable to simulate the actions of autonomous agents in order to 
assess their effects on the system as a whole. 
ODD 
ODD protocol (i.e. overview, design principles, details) constitues a standard protocol 
for describing agent-based models. 
PDA 
Personal degree of attraction defines an agent’s general affinity in this study for a solar 
PV investment in the ABM. 
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1 Introduction and research question 
"The impacts of climate change affect all regions around the world and are expected to intensify 
in the coming decades" (European Comission 2018a). Contributing to approximately 25% of 
global greenhouse gas emissions, the production of electricity and heat is here of particular 
importance (IPCC 2014). However, the global energy usage is expected to increase by 28% 
until 2040 compared to the level of 2015 (U.S. EIA 2017). Thus, an immediate rethinking of 
how to supply this growing demand in the future is inevitable to prevent the potentially 
disastrous consequences, which scientists and experts predict for our planet earth. 
Renewable energy technologies are key to decarbonizing the generation of electricity. They 
have shown an exponential growth in the past two decades, mainly driven by public policies 
and rapid cost reductions (Fraunhofer ISE 2018). Yet, they still reveal a vast potential to exploit. 
While deployment policies that encourage adoption through economic incentives, generally 
have proven to be effective, their cost efficiency remains criticized (Frondel et al. 2010). By 
fostering adoption, policies trigger technology cost reductions through learning effects, 
inducing even more deployment. However, if incentives are not adjusted accordingly, lower 
technology prices may offer unreasonably high returns for investors that reduce the policy’s 
cost efficiency. In order to retain the effectiveness of deployment policies while ensuring their 
cost efficiency a continuous adjustment of the incentive level to environmental influences in 
general and the evolution of the technology costs in particular is needed. However, systematic 
evidence on how to achieve this goal is missing in both literature and practice. 
A previous study evaluated new mechanisms based on control theory principles to adjust 
policy incentives (Nuñez-Jimenez et al., forthcoming). The results suggested the designs could 
produce more effective, cost-efficient and more reliable deployment policies than adjustments 
used in the German feed-in tariff (FIT) policy for solar photovoltaics (PV) from 2000 to 2016. 
However, historical experiences have shown that policy transfer between jurisdictions can lead 
to policy failure, especially when copied to countries with different economic, societal or 
environmental contexts (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000 ⁠; Stone 2017 ⁠; James and Lodge 2016). In 
general, many countries need to deploy renewables at a very large scale in order to comply 
with the Paris Agreement of limiting the increase of global average temperature well below 2°C 
and to ensure emissions to peak as soon as possible (European Comission 2018b). While the 
new design could constitute a policy to be employed across countries, the reproducibility of the 
suggested achievements in Germany into other jurisdictions remains an open question. 
Spain’s deployment policy of solar PV exemplified this general issue as it oriented the design 
towards the historical German mechanism, which is well known for having performed quite 
successful overall (del Rio 2014). However, after a period of moderate adoption, the country 
experienced an unprecedented surge in the deployment of solar PV installations in 2008. 
When policy makers introduced abrupt and retroactive incentive adjustments as a response to 
escalating and unsustainable policy costs, the Spanish solar PV market experienced a sudden 
breakdown and was not able to recover (del Rio 2014). 
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Especially for technologies such as solar PV, the transfer of deployment policies from one 
country to another could be particularly risky. They often combine rapidly evolving technology 
costs, influenced by global and local learning effects, and an attractiveness heavily influenced 
by local factors, such as irradiation and electricity prices. Other upcoming technologies, such 
as batteries, could display similar patterns. This reveals the necessity of evaluating the 
suggested mechanisms under different environmental and societal conditions and especially 
in cases where historical support policies were not as successful as in Germany but faced 
distinctive difficulties. This Master Thesis assesses the suggested policy design by comparing 
its effectiveness and cost efficiency to simulated historical policy outcomes. Its goal is to 
answer the following research questions: 
RQ 1: Could responsive adjustment mechanisms have prevented inefficient or 
ineffective deployment policies in different countries exposed to different conditions? 
RQ 2: How is the performance of responsive adjustment mechanisms driven by their 
policy configuration, namely the magnitude of overall policy targets, the deployment 
timing and the initial incentive conditions? 
The answers indicate if (1) the novel design could offer policy makers a universal tool for 
designing future deployment policies that effectively accelerate the diffusion of technologies 
without becoming too costly, even if the policies get applied in different contexts. In addition, 
they reveal if (2) the new mechanisms can limit the influence of the policy’s configuration on 
the policy’s success. This could make the application of the new design less critical and 
governments more likely to apply deployment policies in the future to mitigate climate change. 
Therefore, this study employs an agent-based model of the socio-technical system for solar 
PV in Switzerland and Spain. The model incorporates individual decision-making based on: 
economic profitability, environmental and technical considerations, the available information 
on solar PV and the impact of social interactions. It manages to reproduce historical 
deployment patterns during the 2004-2016 period in Switzerland and the 1996-2016 period in 
Spain by simulating each country’s historical policy. The model enables to evaluate if the new 
policy design could have prevented the experienced boom and bust cycle of deployment in 
Spain and if a policy continuation could have been ensured with reasonable costs for the 
society. Additionally, it is assessed if and at what cost the new policy designs could have 
steered the Swiss market as steady as in history, but only by adjusting the level of incentives 
and without the assistance of the historically implemented caps on policy costs. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an introduction into 
renewable energy policy and diffusion models. Subsequently, chapter 3 summarizes the case 
selection combined with a brief overview of the historical policy designs. Chapter 4 contains 
an explanation of the methodology applied, which is used to test the scenarios of chapter 5 to 
answer the research questions. The results of these scenarios are illustrated in chapter 6 and 
subsequently discussed in chapter 7. The limitations of the employed model are stated in 
chapter 8. Finally, chapter 9 concludes by summarizing previous chapters, stressing the main 
findings of the study, and providing suggestions for future research. 
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2 Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
In literature, the majority agrees that deployment policies are necessary for most new 
renewable energy technologies to become competitive in the near future (Ibanez-Lopez et al. 
2017 ⁠; Hoppmann et al. 2013 ⁠; Jenner et al. 2013). Generally, an increase in production capacity 
offers learning effects that reduce the capital cost (Wand and Leuthold 2011). However, a 
missing competitiveness of a technology limits deployment and inhibits technological 
improvements. 
In 2016, 126 jurisdictions worldwide had deployment policies for renewable energies in place 
to encourage adoption. Two-thirds used a feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme that guarantees above-
market prices for the electricity sold (REN21 2017). Others fostered the demand for renewable 
energy technologies by reducing the initial investment costs for investors (e.g., through 
investment subsidies), or by mandating a specific amount of electricity production from a 
certain technology in the future (e.g., through renewable portfolio standards) (REN21. 
Renewables 2015 - Global Status Report 2015 ⁠; Solangi et al. 2011 ⁠; Sarzynski et al. 2012). 
Several studies have developed models in order to understand the effect of deployment 
policies on the diffusion of technical renewable energy innovations (Chapter 2.1). However, 
only few have dealt with the question of how to effectively perform incentive adjustments of 
deployment policies that need to comply with evolving technology costs (Chapter 2.2). In 
addition, several studies have investigated the performance of historical deployment policy 
designs and have compared policies across countries. Nevertheless, only little research has 
been done on the question of how the performance of a particular policy design is influenced 
by its area of application or its specific policy configuration (Chapter 2.3). 
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2.1 Renewable energy policy and diffusion models 
A first introduction to the scope, applications, methodology and content of energy system 
models has been given by Hoffman and Wood (1976). Besides an insight into strategic 
planning and policy analysis, they already addressed the question of predicting the direction 
as well as the magnitude of a response to an intervention in energy policies (Hoffman and 
Wood 1976). Generally, literature distinguishes between “bottom-up” models and “top-down” 
models, due to their conceptual structure. 
“Bottom-up” models normally take specific technologies for the energy generation into account. 
Representatives of this category are linear programming models such as MARKAL (Fishbone 
and Abilock 1981) with its consecutive descendent, TIMES (Loulou and Labriet 2008), and 
MESSAGE (Schrattenholzer 1984). Recently, agent-based models that have gained in 
importance within the category of “bottom-up” models dealing with the diffusion of renewable 
energies. In most cases, they only address the diffusion of one specific technical energy 
innovation and focus on understanding the technology adoption process in order to analyze 
the impact of the underlying policy design. 
In contrast, as they focus on macroeconomics, the following models are often described as 
"top-down" models: MERGE (Manne et al. 1995), ABARE (Hinchy 1996), DICE/RICE 
(Nordhaus and Noyer 1999) and GEM-E3 (Capros 2003). The studies assess the impacts of 
climate change policies. Due to their macro approach, they do not include a detailed 
consideration of different technologies and are thus not able to model or evaluate technology 
specific policy measures. 
Grubb et al. (1993) find a major difference between the two approaches outlined before. The 
technology-oriented "bottom-up" engineering models often deduced reduction of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions could to be achievable with net cost savings. In contrast, economic "top-
down" models mostly stressed that goals such as stabilizing fossil-fuel carbon emissions 
already resulted in relatively high costs for the economy. 
In order to assess the impact of changing incentives on adoption, a profound understanding of 
the technology’s diffusion and its drivers in the market is crucial. This thesis investigates the 
performance of a policy adjustment mechanism targeting one individual technology, explicitly 
solar photovoltaics (PV). Thus, understanding the decision-making process of individuals 
whether to invest in a solar PV system and the influence of financial incentives in particular is 
of major importance. While the general diffusion of innovations has long been investigated, 
several studies particularly focus on the adoption of renewable energy technologies. 
Everett M. Rogers (1963), who published "Diffusion of Innovations” in the middle of the 20th 
century, is regarded as the father of diffusion research. Besides his qualitative and explanatory 
theory, mathematical models for consumer durables (Bass 1969) and even a specific approach 
for the spread of technical innovations (Mansfield 1961) have already been developed around 
the same time. The diffusion of technologies is generally characterized by the interplay of a 
large number of actors (e.g. policy makers and firms), networks (formal and informal), and 
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institutions (e.g., norms, values or regulations) within a socio-technical system (Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz 1991 ⁠; Edquist 2009). Large-scale diffusion or adoption of a new technology occurs 
cumulatively over time, and emerges out of decision-making of individuals (Rogers 2003). 
According to the Diffusion of Innovations Theory (DOI), the adoption of a new technology is, 
among other things, based on its relative advantage, compatibility, and ease of use. If it is 
technologically and economically superior to what the individual is currently using, if it fits with 
the individual's lifestyle, if it is simple to use and affordable, it is more likely to be adopted 
(Rogers 2003). 
In order to forecast the diffusion of renewable energies, such as solar PV, or to assess the 
influence of different support policies on adoption, studies have modeled the decision-making 
process of individuals. There are several well-established social psychological theories to 
explain consumers’ acceptance of new technologies, such as the technology acceptance 
model (TAM) (Davis 1989), the model of goal-oriented behavior (MGB) (Perugini and Bagozzi 
2001), the social cognitive theory (SCT) (Locke 1987), the motivation model (MM) (Vallerand 
1997) or the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1991). They all take into account 
different factors that drive the decision of individuals. With regard to the diffusion of renewable 
energies and explicitly the case of solar PV, studies often refer to financial aspects (Pearce 
and Slade 2018 ⁠; Iachini and Borghesi 2015 ⁠; Palmer et al. 2015 ⁠; Robinson et al. 2013), 
environmental aspects (Schelly 2014 ⁠; Rai and McAndrews 2012 ⁠; Palmer et al. 2015 ⁠; Iachini 
and Borghesi 2015), the opinion from peer-to-peer interaction (Islam 2014 ⁠; Rai and 
McAndrews 2012 ⁠; Zhao et al. 2011 ⁠; Robinson et al. 2013) or the influence of media (Zhao et 
al. 2011⁠; Schelly 2014) as main factors. 
In combination with the general theories, they often show two different approaches on how to 
determine these main parameters on the decision to adopt. Rai and McAndrews (2012), 
Schelly (2014) and Islam (2014) use survey data to qualify the most important parameters and 
in the latter case also quantify their relative importance among each other. Conversely, models 
of a second category build their qualitative choice of parameters on findings of previous 
literature and afterwards use a calibration step to determine their relative importance. The 
calibration step is applied to quantitatively weight the parameters until the results of the 
modeled diffusion process match with historical data. 
A selection of models applying one of the two mentioned approaches is shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Studies addressing the diffusion of solar photovoltaic 
Reference Type of Research Focus of Research Regional 
focus 
Technology 
price 
evolution 
Time 
Scopea 
(Pearce and 
Slade 2018) 
Agent based model Evaluating the effect of support 
schemes on adoption of small-scale 
PV 
Great Britain Exogenous 2010-
2016 / 
(2022) 
(Iachini and 
Borghesi 
2015) 
Agent based model Evaluating the effect of social and 
economic factors on adoption of 
residential PV 
Emilia-
Romagna 
region of Italy 
N/A 2007-
2013 
(Palmer et al. 
2015) 
Agent based model Evaluating the effect of support 
schemes on adoption of resid. PV 
Italy Exogenous 2006-
2011 / 
(2026) 
(Robinson et 
al. 2013) 
Agent based model Reproducing historical real-world 
residential PV diffusion data by 
simulating spatially-resolved 
adoption 
Austin, Texas, 
USA 
Exogenous 2005-
2008 / 
(2012) 
(Zhao et al. 
2011) 
Two-level hybrid 
Agents based 
model 
Evaluating the effect of support 
schemes and policy regulations on 
residential PV 
Tuscon, 
Arizona, USA 
Exogenous (20 
years) 
(Grau 2014) Analytic model Reproducing historical real-world 
small-size PV installations and 
assessing different adjustment 
mechanisms against multiple 
scenarios for PV system price 
developments 
Germany Exogenous 2009-
2013 / 
(2016) 
(Yaquob et al. 
2014) 
System dynamics 
model 
Discussing the development of 
resilient and responsive feed in tariff 
policy 
Germany Endogenous (2009-
2014) 
(Islam 2014) Discrete choice 
experiments and 
an innovation 
diffusion model 
Predicting the adoption time 
probabilities of solar PV by 
households 
Ontario, 
Canada 
[-] (10 
years) 
(Rai and 
McAndrews 
2012) 
Survey of 
residential owners 
of solar PV 
systems 
Understanding the experience of 
PV adopters in selecting and 
installing residential PV systems 
Texas, USA [-] [-] 
(Schelly 
2014) 
Interviews with 
early adopters 
Understanding the motivation of 
homeowners to adopt residential 
solar PV 
Wisconsin, 
USA 
[-] [-] 
Note: This is by no means an exhaustive list; further examples, also addressing other technologies than solar PV can be 
found in e.g.: (Cantono and Silverberg 2009), (Ibanez-Lopez et al. 2017), (P. Denholm, E. Drury, and R. Margolis 2009), 
(Sorda et al. 2013) and (Zhang and Nuttall 2011). (a) While the time scope generally refers to the modeled period for which 
historical data was used for training and calibration purposes, the period in parenthesis was predicted by the model without 
any reference data for verification. 
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2.2 Adjustment of deployment policies 
The need to adjust incentives as technology costs evolve is present in theory (Alizamir et al. 
2016 ⁠; Créti and Joaug 2012 ⁠; Wand and Leuthold 2011) and practice (Sijm 2002 ⁠; European 
Comission 2013). Yet, there lacks an agreement on how to perform these adjustments 
accordingly. They are necessary to achieve planned deployment targets, while avoiding 
excessive costs that could strain public resources to the point of compromising the policy’s 
continuity (Hoppmann et al. 2014a). Wand and Leuthold (2011) further argue that incentive 
adjustments are important to ensure deployment following a certain and controllable course 
over time. This would allow exploiting learning effects of new technologies optimally. 
In most cases, incentive levels in history were only revised periodically or as a response to low 
adoption or growing costs (Hoppmann et al. 2014a ⁠; Kreycik et al. 2011). Quite often, this 
resulted in major consequences for the continuity of the policy. For example, favored by falling 
technology prices but steady incentives, Italy experienced a boom in solar PV installations from 
2007 to 2010. Only later in 2011, when the scheduled revision took place, policy makers, 
astonished by annual payments over 6 billion euros, stopped the policy (del Rio 2014 ⁠; Di Dio 
et al. 2015). 
To avoid past incidents in policy outcomes, responsive adjustment mechanisms have gained 
attention in theory and practice. In order to automatically update policy incentive levels, these 
mechanisms follow a predefined procedure that responds to the evolution of certain policy 
outcomes. They are considered a promising tool to ensure the adaptation of incentive levels 
to the effect of technological learning (Klein et al. 2008), to limit policy costs (Kreycik et al. 
2011), and to increase the cost efficiency of deployment policies (Mendonça et al. 2009). 
In practice, responsive adjustment mechanisms have already been applied. Back in 2007, 
California incorporated an adjustment mechanism that reduced incentives for solar PV in the 
event that installation capacity surpassed predefined targets (California Public Utilities 
Commission 2017). A similar measure was adopted by the United Kingdom in 2016 
(Department of Energy & Climate Change, UK 2015). In 2008, Spain introduced automatic FIT 
reductions based on periodic deployment calls (del Rio 2014). Germany introduced an annual 
flexible degression depending on deployment targets in 2009 (Clearingstelle, EEG, KWKG 
2008) and increased the qualifying period to monthly adjustments in 2012 (Clearingstelle, 
EEG, KWKG 2012). 
Policy makers in the past interpreted the application of responsive adjustment mechanisms in 
a variety of ways and with different degrees of success (Klein et al. 2008). Yet, quantitative 
evaluations that investigate the question of how to improve upon historical alternatives is 
missing. This analysis is of particular importance with regard to policy designs targeting 
technologies such as battery storage or electric vehicles, whose evolution of costs show a 
similar behavior as the costs of solar PV (Kittner et al. 2017 ⁠; Nykvist and Nilsson 2015). 
Given the above displayed list of studies in Table 2.1, there already exists a profound 
understanding within the literature of how financial incentives shape the decision process of 
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renewable energy adopters. However, so far only few studies have evaluated quantitatively 
the design of responsive adjustment mechanisms for deployment policies that could set the 
level of incentives for adopters in a suitable way. 
Building upon the agent-based model of the adoption of small-scale solar PV systems in Great 
Britain over the period of 2010-2016, Pearce and Slade (2018) further assess if a similar or 
higher cumulative installed capacity could have been achieved at a lower cost. Therefore, they 
implement logical, simple degression strategies for the FIT (e.g. a linear or percentage 
reduction at regular intervals), possibly in combination with deployment caps. They find out 
that a simple linear degression and a responsive FIT adjustment based on deployment caps 
would have achieved a higher cost efficiency than in history. In addition, responsive 
adjustments would have ensured a higher reliability of policy outcomes (Pearce and Slade 
2018). 
Extending its analytic model to simulate weekly installations of PV systems up to 30 kWp in 
Germany since 2009, Grau (2014) evaluates different FIT adjustment mechanisms against 
multiple scenarios for PV system price developments. Thereby the focus of the analysis lies 
on the impact of (1) degression frequency, (2) adjustment flexibility, and (3) qualifying period. 
He concludes that responsive FIT schemes with frequent tariff adjustments and short qualifying 
periods steer adoption towards deployment targets most effectively. Furthermore, he states 
that monthly flexible degressions had been able to even reach the targets in the case of large 
and sudden price changes (Grau 2014). 
Yaquob and Yamaguchi (2014) study a responsive adjustment mechanism that maintains a 
constant profitability for adopters of rooftop solar PV in Germany between 2009 and 2014. 
They identify that more frequent adjustments ensure a higher cost efficiency and reliability of 
the policy but show slower deployment as investment rushes are prevented (Yaquob et al. 
2014). 
This research project extends previous knowledge. We test our novel adjustments responsive 
not only to deployment but also to policy costs and additionally investigate their impact on the 
uncertainty of policy outcomes. Therefore, the overall model incorporates social, behavioral, 
and non-economic factors that better represent how incentive adjustments influence the 
adoption decision-making process of individuals (Rai et al. 2016 ⁠; Jager 2006). Differentiating 
the effects of global and national technological learning, we incorporate the feedback of policy 
outcomes on the evolution of technology costs. Besides small installations, this research also 
accounts for medium and large systems, covers a long time span including the early years of 
the policy, and explores different temporal distributions of policy targets.  
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2.3 Performance of renewable energy deployment policies 
Previous literature studied historically employed deployment policies across countries with 
respect to their similarities and differences in configurations and evaluated their performance 
(see Table 2.2). Yet, an understanding of how the performance of a particular policy design is 
influenced by its area of application or its specific configuration remains elusive. 
While renewable energy policies in the European Union tend to converge and become more 
similar (Kitzing et al. 2012) critics claim that better policy coordination mechanisms are still 
pending (Reboredo 2015). They would facilitate the substitution of non-renewable for 
renewable energy sources as variations in support schemes generally constitute barriers for 
cooperation (Klinge Jacobsen et al. 2014). Contributing to this effort, first approaches to 
coordinate or even harmonize renewable energy policies have long been around (Ragwitz et 
al. 2011 ⁠; Klinge Jacobsen et al. 2014 ⁠; Jansen 2011 ⁠; Gustav Resch et al. 2013), with the 
Directive 2009/28/EC even on an inter-European level (European Parliament 2018). 
While a transnational conformity of renewable energy deployment policies in particular is still 
missing, the general application of equal policy designs in different jurisdictions revealed risks 
(Evans and Buller 2017 ⁠; James and Lodge 2016 ⁠; Stone 2017). Especially when copying 
policies to countries with different economic, social, or environmental contexts experience has 
shown that policy transfer can lead to policy failure (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). The diffusion 
of renewable energy technologies in general, but especially certain technologies such as solar 
PV or newly emerging technologies like battery storage or electric vehicles might react 
particularly sensitive to these context parameters. They show rapidly developing technology 
costs, combining global and local influences, and an attractiveness heavily influenced by local 
factors such as irradiation or electricity prices. In addition, and besides their possible economic 
profitability under the support of deployment policies, new innovative technologies are products 
that have shown to sometimes be adopted from individuals just out of conviction (Schelly 2014 ⁠; 
Rai and McAndrews 2012). However, the degree of environmental concerns or the financial 
possibilities to allow for such economically nonviable investments might differ across societies. 
Current research confirms the influence of local factors on the outcome of deployment policies. 
Despite their convergence in designs, studies still certify renewable energy policies in different 
countries in Europe large differences in effectiveness and efficiency (Guidolin and Mortarino 
2010 ⁠; Mitchell et al. 2006 ⁠; Haas et al. 2011a ⁠; Jansen 2011) (see Table 2.2). For the particular 
case of solar PV, Jenner et al. (2013) show the interaction between a policy design and local 
factors such as electricity price and electricity production cost to be a relevant determinant of 
renewable energy deployment. 
Recent studies mostly compared the performance of different policy designs across countries. 
This makes a distinction of occurred performance differences between those caused by 
differences in policy designs and those caused by different societal and environmental 
circumstances in the areas of application difficult (see Table 2.2). Even analyses that consider 
similar policy designs, such as only FIT remuneration schemes (Jenner et al. 2013), still focus 
on the individual policies that had been in place in history across countries. These historical 
10 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
 
policies showed differences among their configurations. In particular, they differed with respect 
to the implementation of FIT adjustments over time, the main object of investigation this thesis 
is looking at. 
Besides the general design of a policy and its area of application, literature stresses the 
particular policy configuration as well as the policy execution to be of crucial importance when 
it comes to policy performance. While Haas et al. (Haas et al. 2011a) point out that the decision 
upon specific policy features cannot be neglected, Grubler (2012) generally stresses the 
warning of historical energy transition research of moving “too fast, too big and too early”. 
One major issue of FIT policies discussed in theory and visible in practice is the question of 
how to set the initial level of incentives. Policy makers (European Comission 2005), as well as 
current researchers (Islam 2014 ⁠; Rai and McAndrews 2012) are convinced of the necessity to 
offer potential adopters financial support that ensures investments to be within the range of 
profitability. Otherwise, and besides some early adopters that might consider the economics 
not that important (Schelly 2014), a reasonable and widespread diffusion of the technology will 
not occur. However, the current method of calculations as well as the cost elements taken into 
account in the process of setting national support levels vary greatly (European Comission 
2005 ⁠, 2013). Policy makers in practice are often divided if tariffs are too low or too high 
(Department of Energy & Climate Change, UK 2015). Responsive adjustment mechanisms 
suggest a new approach of how to deal with this issue over time as they do not rely on 
estimating the technology costs or the profitability of adopters. However, the European 
Commission stressed that besides the adjustment of tariffs one major issue lies within the 
difficulty of how to initially set appropriate feed-tariff levels (European Comission 2013). 
The effects of the uncertainty in setting initial incentive levels were quite visible in practice: 
Many countries, including Germany, Spain and France experienced distinct periods of no 
adoption at the beginning of their deployment policies for solar PV due to too low incentive 
levels. After some time, policy makers decided upon a sudden raise to effectively foster 
deployment (see Figure 10.1, A.1). Other countries, such as Great Britain or Switzerland, 
already realized shortly after the policy’s start that their initially provided incentives might have 
been too generous and soon performed drastic incentive cuttings (see Figure 10.1, A.1). 
The general issue of what level of incentives to start a policy with is present in theory and 
practice. Yet, agreement on how to do it remains elusive. While for example Alizamir et al. 
(2016) qualitatively discuss how the level of profitability for adopters should generally decrease 
over time to ensure a high cost-efficient policy, the quantitative effect of different incentive 
levels on the early diffusion phase of a technology remains questionable. 
This thesis gives answers to these questions. It evaluates the achievements of the same novel 
responsive mechanisms in different countries. It focusses not only on a case that has shown 
a quite satisfying policy outcome such as Germany, but on countries comprising different 
environmental and societal contexts, especially countries that showed quite inefficient or 
ineffective deployment policies in the past. For this purpose, this thesis applies the 
mechanisms to the case of Spain and Switzerland that faced distinctive sets of problems in 
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history. Furthermore, it explicitly assesses the influence of different policy configurations in 
each context. This study quantitatively analyzes the impact of different initial incentive levels 
on the outcome of a policy using the suggested novel mechanisms. It approaches the warnings 
of moving “too fast, too big and too early” and investigates the ability of the new design to deal 
with different overall policy targets and a different deployment timing. 
Table 2.2. Studies evaluating renewable energy policy performances across countries 
Reference Technology 
focus 
Performance 
criteria applied 
Policy designs 
investigated 
Regional focus Results 
(Jenner et 
al. 2013) 
Wind and Solar 
PV 
Effectiveness 
as a function of 
ROI 
Historical FIT policy EU-26 FIT has driven solar 
PV deployment; no 
robust evidence that 
FIT has driven wind 
depl. in EU 
(Dong 2012) Wind Effectiveness Historical FIT policy 
and Renewable 
Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) 
53 countries 
around the world 
FIT performs better 
than RPS regarding 
cumulative deployment 
(Jansen 
2011) 
No particular 
technology 
focus 
Efficiency Implementation of new 
Renewable Energy 
Quota System 
Norway, 
Sweden, 
Netherlands 
Harmonisation could 
improve current Policy 
Inefficiency 
(Haas et al. 
2011a) 
No particular 
technology 
focus 
Effectiveness 
and Efficiency 
Historical policies 
without separating 
them 
EU-27 Design criteria of 
policy more important 
than general policy 
design 
(Guidolin 
and 
Mortarino 
2010) 
Solar PV Effectiveness Historical policies 
without separating 
them 
11 countries 
around the world 
Large differences in 
historical policy 
effectiveness 
(Butler and 
Neuhoff 
2008) 
Wind Effectiveness 
and Efficiency 
Historical FIT policy 
(DE) and Project + 
Tradable Green 
Certificate scheme 
(UK) 
Germany and UK FIT reduces costs to 
consumers and result 
in larger deployment 
(Mitchell et 
al. 2006) 
No particular 
technology 
focus 
Effectiveness Historical FIT policy 
(DE) and Renewable 
Obligation (E+WAL) 
Germany and 
England+Wales 
FIT is more effective 
and reduces risk for 
adopters more 
effectively 
(Harmelink 
et al. 2006) 
No particular 
technology 
focus 
Effectiveness Historical policies 
without separating 
them 
EU-15 Additional policies 
needed to achieve set 
RE-EU targets 
(European 
Comission 
2005) 
Wind, Biogas, 
small-scale 
Hydro, Solar 
PV 
Effectiveness Historical policies 
without separating 
them 
EU-15 Different effectiveness 
across historical 
policies 
Note: This is by no means an exhaustive list; further examples can be found in e.g. (Menanteau et al. 2003) and (Haas et al. 
2011b). 
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3 Research Case 
The research project aims at contributing to the improvement of renewable energy support 
policies. It analyzes novel responsive adjustment mechanisms for the incentives of deployment 
policies and evaluates their performance under different conditions in the cases of Switzerland 
and Spain. 
For this purpose, it first focuses on the policy mechanism of feed-in tariffs (FIT). With a high 
impact on the historical deployment of renewable energies and a widespread use, FIT policies 
offer a good data availability. In addition, they can be considered a good proxy for any 
deployment policy based on economic incentives, even for upcoming technologies, such as 
rebates for electric vehicles or investment subsidies for residential battery storage. 
Second, with rapidly decreasing costs, solar photovoltaics (PV) offers a well-suited basis for 
evaluating the performance of the novel responsive mechanisms under particularly demanding 
conditions. The technology will also remain relevant as a case of application for deployment 
policies in the future. In addition, with its modularity and a cost evolution, dependent on global 
and local factors, it largely complies with the expected characteristics of future technologies 
such as batteries. 
3.1 Rationale for focus on feed-in tariffs schemes 
FITs constitute financial incentives offered by policy makers to renewable energy producers. 
Policies using FITs normally include a long-term contract that pays a fixed price per kWh 
(kilowatt hour) of energy produced. The level of the FITs is generally above the wholesale 
electricity market price to compensate producers for the higher investment costs that usually 
come along with renewable energy technologies. 
Quite often, FITs are considered the most effective policy at stimulating the rapid development 
of renewable energy sources (Couture and Gagnon 2010 ⁠; Zhao et al. 2011 ⁠; Kreycik et al. 2011⁠; 
Lesser and Su 2008). Exemplarily, this effectiveness could be seen in pioneering countries 
such as Germany, where the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, 
EEG) based on FITs has been especially successful for solar PV and other renewable energy 
technologies as measured by market growth (Wand and Leuthold 2011). 
FITs can be considered a good proxy for any deployment policy based on economic incentives 
defined by an administration. Despite the prevailing effectiveness of FIT policies in most cases, 
studies are divided with regard to their cost efficiency (Frondel et al. 2010). However, most 
deployment policies for renewable energies rely on FIT remuneration schemes (REN21 2017). 
Additionally, for the support of new technologies, such as e.g. battery storage or electric 
vehicles, there is no indication that deployment policies based on economic incentives similar 
to FITs will be replaced in the near future. 
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3.2 Rationale for focus on solar PV technology 
Since costs for solar panels generally experience a particularly fast decrease over time 
(Candelise et al. 2013 ⁠; Hernández-Moro and Martínez-Duart 2013) solar PV offers an 
especially demanding environment to evaluate the new suggested adjustment mechanisms 
for incentives. In order to ensure the cost efficiency of deployment policies, while retaining their 
effectiveness, the adjustment of incentives as technology costs evolve is one of the key 
challenges (Wand and Leuthold 2011 ⁠; Créti and Joaug 2012 ⁠; Sijm 2002 ⁠; Alizamir et al. 2016). 
Solar PV is a modularly built technology, which makes prices dependent on global and local 
learning effects. Additionally, the attractiveness of the technology is heavily influenced by its 
area of application comprising different irradiation or electricity prices. Simultaneously, the 
rapid price evolution of solar PV might be similar to the one of future technologies, as for 
example batteries or electric vehicles. 
Furthermore, solar PV is expected to remain a case of application for deployment policies as 
the technology still offers a tremendous potential to exploit in the future. The technology directly 
uses solar power that is compared to geothermal and tidal energy by far the biggest source of 
renewable energy (World Energy Council 2013). The solar PV technology has broken new 
records in the recent past. During 2016 solar power was the fastest-growing source of new 
energy worldwide. It grew by 50%, reaching over 74 GWp and is expected to keep this leading 
position in the near future (IEA - International Energy Agency 2017a). 
3.3 Case selection – objects of investigation 
This thesis performs a cross-country comparison of the novel responsive adjustment 
mechanisms to gather a more precise understanding of whether, and if so, how different 
contexts influence its applicability and performance. It extends the investigations done in the 
German case to two further countries whose selection process is outlined in the following. 
To select well suited research cases for answering our research question this chapter carries 
out a high-level preselection process of all countries around the world (Chapter 3.3.1), followed 
by a more detailed analysis of the resulting shortlist (Chapter 3.3.2). The preselection ensures 
a minimum scope of technological adoption, the applicability of the modeled adoption decision 
process and the existence of the investigated policy design in history. The country-specific 
analysis then sheds light on historical policy performances in order to select interesting cases 
that indicate particularly demanding conditions to test the new policy design in. 
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3.3.1 High-level country preselection 
In order to pass the high-level preselection process (see Table 3.1), countries need to fulfill the 
following three necessary criteria: 
a) Above minimum cumulative [1 GWp] and per capita [100 Wp] installed solar PV 
capacity in the considered country to ensure an adequate basis for investigation 
b) European country to ensure the applicability of the modeled adoption decision process  
c) Historical application of a FIT policy for solar PV 
This study evaluates novel adjustment mechanisms by comparing their performance to 
historical policy outcomes. First, by referring to findings in literature, this thesis models the 
adoption decision of individuals in a certain country and calibrates the model against historical 
patterns. Then, while keeping the same decision rationales, we expose the potential adopters 
to a different policy design to evaluate the resulting policy outcome under the novel 
mechanisms. 
a.) The larger the data basis for modeling the adoption the more accurate the modeled decision 
rationales. The spread of solar PV is a process of diffusion that generally emerges from the 
sum of individual decisions. Analyzing a country where more individuals in total, as well as a 
higher share of individuals participated in the process increases the certainty of actually 
representing the distinctive, country specific decision rationales. 
Thus, we only focus on the biggest solar PV markets in 2016 with a "total cumulative installed 
capacity above or equal to 1 GWp", leaving 23 countries in the short-list (see Table 3.1). As a 
reference of magnitude, the two biggest nuclear reactors in the world are in the "Chooz Nuclear 
Power Plant" in France with a peak net electrical capacity of around 1.5 GWp each (WDR 
2017). This criterion avoids the investigation of a fairly small country or even a city state, such 
as Monaco, were the limited data basis of only a few overall installations complicates to model 
a representative and generalizable decision-making process of adopters. 
Additionally, we limit the considered 23 countries within the first selection to those with an 
"average installed capacity per capita of above 100 Wp". As a reference of magnitude, the 
energy expenditure during sleeping hours is around 90 and 75 watts for men and women 
respectively (Garby et al. 1987) or 100 watts for a classic light bulb. The second criterion avoids 
the investigation of a deployment driven by just a few individuals in a big country, such as 
India, whose decision criteria might not be representative and generalizable for the whole 
country.  
b.) Additionally, we only focus on European countries where the assumption of common 
decision-making processes, following the influencing factors identified in current literature is 
more likely to hold true. 
c.) Given that we analyze a FIT policy design for the case of solar PV, countries need to have 
applied such a policy in history, in order to have a reference to compare and calibrate the 
model to. 
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Our preselection process (see Table 3.1) results in 8 countries undergoing a more detailed 
investigation hereafter, namely Germany, Italy, Great Britain, France, Spain, Czech 
Republic, Switzerland and Austria. 
Table 3.1: High-level country preselection 
Criterion a) a) b) c) 
Country Cumulative 
installed solar PV 
capacity 
2016 [ GWp ] 
Per capita 
installed solar PV 
capacity 
2016 [ Wp / capita ] 
European country Nationwide FIT 
support scheme 
for solar PV 
China 78.07 56 NO N/A 
Japan 42.75 334 NO N/A 
Germany 41.22 504 YES YES 
United States 40.3 126 NO N/A 
Italy 19.28 324 YES YES 
Great Britaina 11.63 178 YES YES 
India 9.01 7 NO N/A 
France 7.13 111 YES YES 
Australia 5.9 248 NO N/A 
Spain 5.49 118 YES YES 
South Korea 4.35 86 NO N/A 
Belgium 3.42 303 YES NO 
Canada 2.72 76 NO N/A 
Greece 2.6 232 YES N/A 
Thailand 2.15 31 NO N/A 
Czech Republic 2.1 198 YES YES 
Netherlands 2.1 124 YES NO 
Switzerland 1.64 197 YES YES 
Chile 1.61 91 NO N/A 
South Africa 1.45 26 NO N/A 
Taiwan 1.38 59 NO N/A 
Romania 1.3 65 YES N/A 
Austria 1.08 124 YES YES 
Note: Bold characters indicate that the country meets the criterion in the respective category for the high-level country 
preselection. The grey shade indicates that the country meets all three criteria for the high-level country preselection. (a) Due 
to the negligible amount of solar PV installations in Northern Ireland and given its non-consideration within the support scheme 
in the United Kingdom, Great Britain is evaluated on a non-State level. 
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3.3.2 Country specific final selection and definition of policy effectiveness 
and efficiency 
For the performance assessment of the historical deployment policies, we apply an 
effectiveness and an efficiency criterion. Although a policy’s success is hard to grasp and not 
clearly defined in theory or practice, different ways to measure the performance of a policy 
have been discussed in previous literature. Referring to this literature, we decide upon one 
definition for each criterion, for policy effectiveness and for policy efficiency. We apply both 
criteria to all countries of the high-level country preselection and finally choose two countries 
based on the results as further research cases for this study. 
3.3.2.1 Policy effectiveness 
For the assessment of a policy’s effectiveness, studies propose to compare either the 
cumulative or the annually added capacity with a certain reference value of either a pre-set 
installation or generation target (Butler and Neuhoff 2008 ⁠; Harmelink et al. 2006) or a 
previously determined installation or generation potential for a country (European Comission 
2005). The results of these suggestions are highly dependent on the choice of the target or 
reference value and the reasoning behind these choices might distort the results. To avoid 
this, we keep the effectiveness criterion quite simple and limit it to "per capita installed solar 
PV capacity", already used in the high-level country preselection. 
3.3.2.2 Policy efficiency 
Referring to a policy’s efficiency, Menanteau et al. (2003), Haas et al. (2011b) and Frondel et 
al. (2010) determine the cumulative capacity, the added annual generation per capita or the 
amount of CO2 avoided, relative to the cost involved. Oriented towards Menanteau et al. 
(2003), we define the efficiency criterion also as a cost efficiency criterion estimating the 
policy’s “cumulative installed solar PV capacity per overall FIT policy cost”. 
3.3.2.3 Limitations of chosen criteria 
The definitions of our criteria reveal certain limitations. Thus, the final classification of policy 
characteristics is only meant to reveal countries whose historical deployment policies have 
shown extreme outcomes. This might offer indications of a country with particularly demanding 
conditions. It does not constitute a final statement upon better or worse policy designs. By 
choosing a capita specific characteristic value for the effectiveness, we comply with the 
different overall sizes of countries. However, as already targeted by the approaches in 
literature, this does not consider the variety of potentials countries might offer, such as suitable 
sites for systems or irradiation intensity. Besides driving the effectiveness of a policy, these 
deviations in potentials might also heavily influence the policy’s cost efficiency. In general, the 
implementation of e.g. a certain PV capacity under better conditions, such as a sunnier region 
should expected to be feasible with less overall costs. Furthermore, a delayed deployment to 
times when PV prices had already decreased due to learning effects from other countries 
should also require less financial support. 
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3.3.2.4 Assumptions and calculation basis for efficiency criterion 
While the historical deployment and a country’s population directly reveal the defined 
effectiveness of a policy, the calculations estimating the cost efficiency as defined within the 
criteria are built upon the following simplified assumptions: 
1) The calculation only considers the cost of paid FITs; no other subsidy mechanism is 
taken into account even if it might have also been in place in history. 
2) If no other information is available, all installations that were built during an active FIT 
policy are assumed to have been remunerated by this support mechanism. 
3) Policy costs are interpreted as the difference between paid FITs and a national solar 
PV specific wholesale electricity price at sun peak hours (11 am – 4 pm). 
4) Policy costs include all payments that are expected to be performed during the entire 
eligible period of guaranteed remuneration of each country. 
In most cases, this method of cost calculations differs from the ones used by governments, 
which often do not include already pledged but not yet performed future payments to solar 
generators. However, given different timings of deployment and different shares of payments 
still outstanding, the chosen approach ensures a better comparability across countries. 
Explicitly, the policy cost efficiency is defined as the cumulative installed capacity throughout 
the policy’s active period but before December 2016, divided by the total support costs of the 
FIT scheme until December 2016. 
Policy cost efficieny = 
Cumulative installed capacity [Wp]
Poliy costs [EUR]
 (Eq. 1) 
The total policy costs include the support costs for all installations built in a given month, 
summed up over the entire active period of the policy but before December 2016. 
Policy costs [EUR] = ∑ Policy costs
month
 [EUR]
min[policy end month; Dec 2016]
month = poliy start month
 (Eq. 2) 
The total support costs for installations built in a given month (Cap
month
) include all remuneration 
costs for the expected energy produced over the entire guaranteed payment period of the 
considered country (Pay. Period) allocated to the month of adoption. 
Poliy costsmonth [EUR] = 
 ∑
Cap
month
[kWp] • Solar capacity factor [
kWh
kWp•a
]  • Remuneration costs [
EUR
kWh
]
(1 + Government discount rate )year 
Pay. Period
year=1
 
(Eq. 3) 
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The costs for remuneration derive from the difference between the FIT at the month of the 
adoption and the wholesale electricity market price. Until 2017, the wholesale electricity price 
paid for energy produced by solar PV is estimated as the average yearly day-ahead-auction 
wholesale electricity price between 11 am and 4 pm in each country, representing the time for 
sun peak hours. Afterwards, a yearly price increase of 1.5% is assumed (Hoppmann et al. 
2014b). 
Remuneration costs [
EUR
kWh
]  = Feed-in tariffmonth [
EUR
kWh
]  - Wholesale electricity market priceyear [
EUR
kWh
] (Eq. 4) 
A summary of the used data and its sources can be found in the appendix (see A.1). 
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the eight countries from the high-level preselection process 
displaying the estimations on historical policy performance with regard to the defined 
effectiveness and efficiency criteria. It reveals a relatively heterogeneous picture across 
countries. For the effectiveness, we can observe values varying between just over 100 
Wp/capita in France and Spain to more than 500 Wp/capita in Germany. Partially explainable 
by the countries’ population sizes, the overall cumulated installed solar PV capacity per country 
lies in a wide interval from just over 1 GWp in Austria to over 40 GWp in Germany. 
With regard to the efficiency criterion, Switzerland is listed twice. While the uncommented label 
assumes all installations to receive a feed-in remuneration, the corrected label considers that 
this assumption does not hold true. Given policy cost caps in the Swiss policy design, a 
significant amount of installations did not get any feed-in remuneration. However, their 
installation was performed during the policy’s active period, most likely motivated by the hope 
of future remuneration. Consequently, these installations are included in the effectiveness as 
they actually were installed, but they do not drive up the corrected policy costs as they did not 
receive any feed-in remuneration (for further information see Chapter 3.3.4). 
Finally, regarding the cost efficiency, Spain and the Czech Republic stand out negatively. Both 
show a relatively low installation capacity per EUR of policy costs of 0.09 Wp/EUR and 0.12 
Wp/EUR respectively. In contrast, Austria and the corrected policy estimation for Switzerland 
stand out positively. Both deployment policies in these countries show relatively high cost 
efficiencies of 0.57 Wp/EURa and 0.85 Wp/EUR. 
Based on the results we select Spain and Switzerland as the research cases of this study to 
evaluate the new responsive adjustment mechanisms. This allows us to cover a wide range of 
estimated historical policy performances (see Figure 3.1). 
Among all eight countries, Spain shows the lowest historical policy effectiveness and the 
lowest policy efficiency. Additionally, it indicates to be an interesting case with a particularly 
demanding environment. The literature states Spain as the most famous case of a failed 
support policy for solar PV that ended up in an immediate shutdown of the policy after periods 
of dramatic difficulties (del Rio 2014 ⁠; European Environment Agency 2014b). We would thus 
like to see if by the use of the new policy design, the Spanish PV market could have been 
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controlled in a more sustainable way. Explicitly we want to test, if the experienced installation 
boom of 2008 could have been prevented and if a policy continuation could have been ensured 
with reasonable costs for the society. 
In contrast, the historical policy in Switzerland reveals an outstanding cost efficiency, despite 
showing similarly little effectiveness. However, this cost efficiency was only achieved thanks 
to many installations that did not receive any feed-in remuneration from the government. 
Besides many PV systems that were built without getting remunerated, even more interested 
adopters, awaiting a release of financial support, did not perform their investment. The rush 
from interested investors that refrained from the investment due to insufficient funds even 
increased throughout the years (Bundesamt für Energie BFE). Consequently, this restrictive 
policy design with its policy cost caps might have constituted a bottleneck for adoption. Given 
the demand for support largely exceeding the provision of funds, one might suspect that even 
for lower incentive levels the entire provided financial resources could have been transformed 
into solar PV installations. In sum, we would thus like to assess if and at what cost the new 
policy design that remunerates all interested adopters, could have steered the Swiss market 
similar to history but only by adjusting the level of incentives and without caps on policy costs. 
Although qualitative particularities of the individual policies are only discussed for the two 
selected countries, an overview for all eight countries can be found in the appendix (see A.2). 
  
Note: Cumulative installed capacity in 2016 is taken from IEA PVPS (2017c). The values for the efficiency are generally based 
on the defined assumptions for the estimation of policy costs of Chapter 3.3.2. For countries that do not have the euro, monthly 
exchange rates are used to convert policy costs into euros (boerse.de). Switzerland is additionally listed in a corrected version 
(SWITZERLAND_corr.) given the knowledge that one of the defined assumptions did not hold true (see Chapter 3.3.2.4). 
Figure 3.1. Effectiveness-efficiency – Historical policy mapping across countries 
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3.3.3 Summary of historical policy design and environmental conditions in 
Spain 
With around 46 million inhabitants, a population density of 93 people per square kilometer and 
an overall size of 505’990 square kilometers, Spain is the fourth biggest country as well as the 
sixth biggest economy in Europe, measured by gross domestic product (GDP) (United Nations 
2018). Given the geographical location, fixed PV systems in Spain achieve an average yield 
of 1461 kWh/kWp (European Comission 2016) that could be increased by around 30-40% by 
the use of two-axis tracking systems (Huld et al. 2008 ⁠; Eke and Senturk 2012). 
Spain introduced its Electricity Sector Law in 1997 (Real Decreto 54/1997) but first uncoupled 
their FITs for solar PV from the prevailing electricity price in January 2004. In 2012 the support 
policy for new solar PV systems came to a complete moratorium (del Rio 2014). While there 
was no limitation on solar PV systems remunerated until September 2008, Spain introduced 
capacity quotas on the amount of installed capacity receiving remuneration in October 2009 
that lasted until the policy’s end in 2012. 
The FIT paid to each project was the one that was in place at the date of installation and 
constant for the total funding period of a system. Initially, in 2004, support was guaranteed for 
the whole lifetime of the plant declining after some years but was finally adjusted to 28 years 
for plants built under RD661/2007. For plants built since December 2008, the overall funding 
period was limited to 25 years (del Rio 2014). 
3.3.4 Summary of historical policy design and environmental conditions in 
Switzerland 
With just over 8 million inhabitants and a population density of 196 people per square kilometer 
on an overall size of only 41’285 square kilometers, Switzerland is only the 31st biggest country, 
but still the eight biggest economy in Europe, measured by GDP (United Nations 2018). On 
average, PV systems in Switzerland can achieve a yield of 950 kWh/kWp (pronovo 2018). 
In Switzerland the first nationwide FIT policy, named "additional costs financing" (MKF, 
Mehrkostenfinanzierung) came into force in January 2005 (Bundesamt für Energie BFE) that 
was changed to a “feed-in remuneration at cost” (KEV, kostendeckende Einspeisevergütung) 
in January 2009. 
With the introduction of the KEV, Switzerland also introduced policy cost caps that limited the 
available KEV fund for each year. In order to ensure that these caps were respected, potential 
operators of renewable electricity plants needed to apply for KEV payments by registering on 
a waiting list. This implied that there were a limited number of projects that could be financed 
per year. The waiting list was ordered by registration dates, independent of whether an 
installation had already been built or not. When new funds were provided, projects with the 
earliest registration dates were released for remuneration first. However, there was no 
certainty about the provision of new funds in the future. Eventually, during 2017 no new funds 
for the KEV were provided and in 2018 the KEV was completely stopped. Until December 
2016, 11’563 PV installations with a capacity of 526 MWp had been accepted and released for 
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the KEV and had started to receive the feed-in remuneration. However, another 35’028 
projects with a capacity of 2’105 MWp were still registered on the waiting list and were still 
awaiting their release for the KEV, which never happened afterwards. In particular, over 1’000 
MWp of these waiting projects were already installed in the meantime and were already 
producing energy, most of the times sold to the local electric utility for a price far below the FIT 
in place. After the KEV was finally stopped, the government started to pay those already 
implemented projects a one-time investment subsidy (EIV, Einmalvergütung) instead of the 
expected feed-in remuneration as a compensation. However, this one-time compensation was 
significantly below the payments investors would have received within the KEV (Bundesamt 
für Energie BFE). 
Generally, the FIT paid to each project with the benefit of having gotten released for the KEV 
was the one that was in place at the date of installation and constant for the total eligible period 
of remuneration. As FITs decreased over time, investors with an earlier installation date thus 
received higher incentives per kWh of energy produced throughout their entire eligible period 
of remuneration. However, the eligible period for remuneration did not start before a project 
was released for remuneration within the KEV. Then, the period latest ended after 25 years for 
systems that were installed until the end of 2013 and after 20 years for systems that were 
installed afterwards, counted from the date of the installation of a project. Furthermore, 
payments were not performed retroactively for energy produced before the eligible period 
started. Thus, if a system was installed before its release, the meantime between installation 
and release for the KEV shortened the total funding period of remuneration (Bundesamt für 
Energie BFE). 
Consequently, interested investors were facing the following situation: An early installation 
without immediate remuneration bears the risk of building a system that only receives 
remuneration during a shortened and not precisely foreseeable funding period or at worst 
receives no remuneration at all. However, in the case of remuneration it ensures payments 
based on a relatively high FIT. Alternatively, the postponement of an installation until the 
project gets released for remuneration avoids the above-mentioned uncertainties but would 
receive a future FIT that is not foreseeable and most likely significantly lower (pronovo 2018). 
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4 Methodology 
In order to test the performance of the novel responsive adjustment mechanism, we need to 
evaluate its interplay with and its impact on the evolution of a country’s solar photovoltaic (PV) 
deployment system. Performing experiments in the real world would be extremely slow and 
costly. Therefore, we need to formulate a simplified representation of the real system that we 
can then experiment on (Railsback and Grimm 2012, p. 4). 
4.1 Rationale for Agent Based Modelling 
Agent-based models (ABMs) offer a wide set of characteristics that are favorable in our case: 
AMBs are able to model micro-based behavior of individuals in order to explain marcro-level 
phenomena (Bonabeau 2002). The diffusion of solar PV is a process of emergence that arises 
from the interaction and response of individual economic actors (i.e. agents) to the behavior of 
each other and their environment (Railsback and Grimm 2012). ABMs allow to model system-
level dynamics, such as technological learning of solar PV, which is driven by the agents’ 
behavior but also influences their decisions (Schaeffer et al. ⁠; Bollinger and Gillingham 2014). 
The framework of ABMs allows to simulate heterogeneous agents with unique and individual 
preferences and characteristics (Palmer et al. 2015 ⁠; Rai and Robinson 2015). This complies 
with the diversity of potential solar PV adopters in a market. 
Furthermore, ABMs account for spatial resolution. Usually, agents do not interact with all other 
agents but only with a limited selection. Thus, the social network of an agent, determining the 
interactions with other agents, is at least partially driven by the agent's geographical location 
(Railsback and Grimm 2012 ⁠; Bollinger and Gillingham 2012). A number of studies have shown 
that particularly in the diffusion of solar PV peer effects exist and the information by word of 
mouth of major importance is (Bollinger and Gillingham 2012 ⁠; Linder 2013 ⁠; Richter 2013 ⁠; Rai 
and Robinson 2013). Furthermore, the integration of GIS-data (geographic information 
systems) allows for greater precision by exposing agents to realistic environmental influences, 
such as in our case to precise solar radiation values (Robinson et al. 2013). 
Additionally, given the stochastic nature of ABMs, they also offer the possibility of estimating 
how the adjustment mechanisms influence the variability of policy outcomes. Moreover, the 
dynamic structure, being an essential characteristic of a diffusion process over time, is already 
implemented in the model’s framework (Dawid 2006). Consequently, ABMs show to be a 
suitable tool to be used for the desired purpose and to account for most characteristics 
specifically applying to our object of investigation. 
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4.2 Model description 
The model description is oriented towards the main aspects of the ODD protocol (i.e. overview, 
design principles, details), a standard protocol for describing ABMs (Grimm et al. 2010 ⁠; Grimm 
et al. 2006). The protocol is chosen in order to make the model description more 
understandable and complete, thereby supporting its reproducibility. Within the following three 
sections we  present an overview and the purpose of the model (see Chapter 4.2.1), introduce 
the model entities and their state variables (see Chapter 4.2.2), as well as spatial and temporal 
scales of the model (see Chapter 4.2.3), and outline key processes and scheduling (see 
Chapter 4.2.4). 
4.2.1 Purpose of the model and model overview 
4.2.1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of our model is to represent the historical socio-technical evolution in a country's 
solar PV market. This allows to enhance system understanding of the technology adoption 
process and to evaluate the performance of novel responsive adjustment mechanisms for the 
feed-in tariff (FIT). 
4.2.1.2 Overview 
Figure 4.1 shows a simplified process structure of the model, giving an overview of its general 
logic. The key output measures of the model are deployment dynamics (i.e. monthly installed 
capacity, overall installed capacity) and costs of policy measures (i.e. monthly policy costs, 
overall policy costs). The model is mainly composed of three subparts that are executed in a 
recurring sequence: (1) The adoption decision-making of the model’s agents, (2) the resulting 
technological learning of solar PV, and (3) the policy adjustment mechanism. 
First, every potential solar PV adopter – residential, commercial and industrial, and utility-scale 
agents – undergoes a decision-making process of whether to install a solar PV system or not. 
Therefore, the agent first needs to develop the idea of an installation. This procedure is 
modeled as a weighted linear combination of the actors' personal awareness of the technology 
(Awarenessj), the information situation with regard to solar PV (ArticlesPVt), the fraction of actors 
that have installed a PV system in the country (Peerst) and the country's average profitability of 
an investment in a solar PV system in the given month (IRRt). The weighting of each factor is 
determined during the calibration of the model. 
Once an agent has developed the idea to install solar PV, it computes the net present value 
(NPV) of adopting solar PV and defines the investment to be attractive if the NPV is non-
negative or if the agent represents a residential agent whose environmental awareness is 
extraordinarily high. All systems that are considered attractive by the agent are executed, 
except for projects for which remuneration is not immediately available. For example, this can 
be the case due to policies’ cost caps as they had been implemented in Switzerland or policies’ 
deployment caps as they had been implemented in Spain between 2009 and 2011. In this 
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case, the agent in Spain does not install but undergoes the whole process again in the next 
month. In contrast, given the possibility to register on a waiting list for remuneration in 
Switzerland, the agent facing this situation in Switzerland, undergoes an additional decision-
making process evaluating a potential postponement of the investment. Therefore, it compares 
the expected NPV of an immediate investment with the expected NPV of a postponement, 
taking into account a certain risk aversion of the agent. In the event of a postponement, the 
solar PV system is implemented as soon as remuneration is offered to the agent by the policy. 
Second, the price of solar PV progresses down the technology’s learning curve according to 
national and worldwide demand from adopters. Solar PV modules are widely considered a 
global product whose technological learning depends on global deployment. In contrast, the 
cost evolution of the balance of system, namely inverters and installation services, relies to a 
large extent on a regional learning process (Schaeffer et al. ⁠; Bollinger and Gillingham 2014). 
Our model considers this by employing one global experience curve for solar PV modules, and 
one national experience curve for non-module components of the system. 
Finally, the responsive policy mechanism calculates the adjustment of the FIT for the following 
month, based on two variables. Therefore, it determines the deviation of one of the key output 
measures, deployment or costs, to predefined policy targets. It considers the deviation for the 
current month and the deviation on a cumulative basis over all months since the policy started. 
 
Note: The three modules of our ABM: (1) adoption decision-making, (2) technological learning and (3) policy adjustment, 
influence each other directly and through feedback loops. The FIT and installed capacity (A) connect policy adjustment and 
adoption decision-making. Typically, as the FIT increases, it encourages more adoption raising the installed capacity, which in 
turn triggers the adjustment of the FIT. The installed capacity and PV system price (B) connect adoption decision-making and 
technological learning. As installed capacity grows, the technology progresses down its experience curve lowering PV system 
prices. In turn, lower prices facilitate more adoption, closing the loop. Finally, the FIT, installed capacity and PV system price 
(C) connect policy adjustment and technological learning. As a higher FIT leads to growing installed capacity by promoting 
adoption, technological learning pushes down PV system prices. This indirectly influences the policy adjustment through 
adoption decision-making as policy targets are defined in terms of deployment or policy costs. 
Figure 4.1. Agent-based model process structure of solar PV adoption 
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The costs of the policy are defined as the expenditures by the government within the FIT 
scheme over the whole period of years of guaranteed payments, allocated to the month of the 
adoption (see Equation 5). Explicitly, only the difference between the FIT at the month of 
adoption and the wholesale electricity price is considered. Until 2017, the wholesale electricity 
price paid for energy produced by solar PV is estimated as the average yearly day-ahead-
auction wholesale electricity price between 11 am and 4 pm in each country, representing the 
time for sun peak hours. Afterwards, a yearly price increase of 1.5% is assumed (Hoppmann 
et al. 2014b). For the government’s historical discount rate, the interest rate of the countries’ 
historical bonds in the month of adoption are used. In most cases, this method of calculation 
differs from the ones used by governments, as they often do not include already pledged but 
not yet performed future payments to solar generators. While our method hinders a direct 
comparison to historical policy cost data, it facilitates the comparability among different 
countries as it considers the different timings of deployment. 
Policy costs [local currency] = 
∑
(FIT0 - Wholesale electricity market priceyear) • Electricity generation • (1 - Self-consumption)
(1 + Government discount rate)year
Pay. Period
year=1
 
(Eq. 5) 
4.2.2 Entities and state variables 
The model only comprises two hierarchical levels: (i) individual agents and (ii) the observer 
defining the conditions the individual actors are exposed to. 
(i) Every individual agent represents a potential solar PV investor in the respective country. 
Agents are assigned to representing households, commercial and industrial actors and utility-
scale actors. Based on their actor type and based on historical country specific data, every 
agent is assigned a certain PV size it might consider building. It owns a different self-
consumption rate, pays a different electricity price, receives a different level of incentives and 
owns a different production factor [Mean 0.9, Standard deviation 0.2], which accounts for the 
heterogeneity of each installation (e.g., orientation, tilt, shading). 
Furthermore, every agent owns socio-demographic variables, such as PV awareness as a 
normal distribution but limited to positive values [Mean 0.5, Standard deviation 0.2] and a 
discount rate, including a randomly assigned delta to the cost of capital for each agent type 
[Mean 0, Standard deviation 1]. 
(ii) The higher hierarchical level in the model is the observer, a system-level entity, responsible 
for global time-keeping, policy characteristics (i.e. setting FIT levels, determining PV 
information) and technology characteristics (i.e. PV efficiency). Additionally, it tracks the output 
variables of the overall population of agents such as policy cost and deployment. 
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Table 4.1: Main variables of potential adopters by type and country 
Country 
Type of 
adopter 
System 
size 
[kWp]a 
Solar self-
consumption 
rateb 
Electricity rate 
Discount 
ratec 
Incentived 
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
 
Residential 0-30 kWp 30%e 
Historical rates 
for households.f 
Historical 
lending rate.g 
100% 
Commercial 
and Industrial 
30-100 
kWp 
20%e 
Hist. rates for 
small/medium 
industry.f 
Historical 
lending rate.g 
85% 
Utility-scale 
100-1,000 
kWp 
40%e 
Historical rates 
for big industry.f 
Historical 
lending rate.g 
80% 
S
p
a
in
 
Residential 0-20 kWp 30%e 
Historical rates 
for households.f 
Historical 
lending rate.g 
100% 
Commercial 
and Industrial 
20-100 
kWp 
20%e 
Hist. rates for 
small/medium 
industry.f 
Historical 
lending rate.g 
95% 
Utility-scale 
100-5,000 
kWp 
0%e 
Historical rates 
for big industry.f 
Historical 
lending rate.g 
90% 
(a) The relative frequency of the different sizes within the range for each type of adopter follows the distribution of remunerated 
solar PV systems within the KEV between 2006 and 2016 in Switzerland (Bundesamt für Energie BFE) and registered solar 
PV systems at the ministry for ecological transformation in Spain (Gobierno de España, Ministerio para la Transición 
Ecológica.) respectively. The size ranges reflect a consolidated version of the different categories considered by the KEV in 
Switzerland and by the Royal Decree 661/2007 in Spain respectively. (b) Solar self-consumption rate is the fraction of 
electricity generated from the solar PV system that is consumed by the adopter. (c) The historical lending rate for each adopter 
type is added to the individual discount rate of each agent. (d) Fraction of the incentive received by each adopter type if the 
novel responsive adjustment mechanism is active. Values are derived from the historical capacity weighted average of 
incentive fractions for each category within the policy of each country. For model calibration the real historical values are 
used. (e) The self-consumption rate of each agent is randomly assigned from a normal distribution with the above mean, an 
assumed standard deviation of 0.05 and truncated between zero and one for each adopter type. The values of the mean are 
adopted from studies within the German market (Fraunhofer ISE 2018). For utility-scale agents in Spain the self-consumption 
rate is set to zero, given the size of installations and the almost exclusive application of ground-mounted systems in this 
category. (f) Estimated monthly electricity rates based on historical values, please see appendix A.5. (g) Historical lending 
rates based on long-term loans interest rates, please see appendix A.6. 
4.2.3 Scale, temporal and spatial resolution 
4.2.3.1 Scale 
Optimally, we would represent every potential solar PV investor in reality by exactly one agent 
in the model. However, given computational power constraints this is not expedient, especially 
not for representations of large-scale systems like a country's solar PV adoption process. Thus, 
the model contains consistent "resize-population" scaling parameters that scale the number of 
agents implemented and allow for shorter simulation times. 
The model revealed that scaling works well for agent-groups with a rather large number of 
actors such as households in Spain. For these groups, the agent scale may be increased up 
to 1:2000 without significant effects on the results of the model. This scaling factor would 
indicate that every 2000th potential solar PV investor in reality, is represented by one agent in 
the model. In contrast, the robustness of the calibration for large scaling factors is more 
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problematic for groups with less agents, e.g. utility-scale actors in Switzerland. During the 
calibration, and in the further scenarios of the model, the following scaling factors are used: 
Table 4.2: Number of agents and scaling factors of potential adopters by type and country 
Country Type of adopter 
Number of estimated 
agents 
Model scaling 
factor 
Number of modeled 
agents due to 
rescaling 
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
 
Residential 1445850a 1:200 7229 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
457395b 1:50 9147 
Utility-scale 30937c 1:2 15468 
S
p
a
in
 
Residential 18252800a 1:2000 9126 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
7532271b 1:500 15064 
Utility-scale 99697c 1:5 19939 
(a) Number of owner-occupied households in Spain (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) and Switzerland (Bundesamt für 
Statistik) in 2014 respectively. (b) Average number of firms, except insurance activities of holdings and electricity and finance 
firm  in Switzerland and Spain in 2014 (Eurostat). (c) Average number of electricity, financial and insurance firms in Switzerland 
(Bundesamt für Statistik) and Spain (Eurostat) in 2014. 
4.2.3.2 Temporal distribution 
One time step in the model refers to one month in reality, being the shortest time period that 
is considered between two FIT adjustments. The underlying data allows the model to start 
earliest in 1991 and to run until the end of 2016. The actual running period is country dependent 
and oriented towards the time period of historical policy activity (see Chapter 4.2.4.1). 
4.2.3.3 Spatial resolution 
The model's agents are distributed according to the number of residential buildings in the 
countries' regional subdivisions, namely by the cantons in Switzerland (Bundesamt für 
Statistik) and the autonomous communities in Spain respectively (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística), thus receiving a distinctive annual irradiation based on their location (NASA). 
The patches of the model are the spatial grid units, limited within each country's borders. The 
scaling of patches depends on the overall size of the country. In the Swiss model, we employ 
geographical patches of 10 per 10 kilometers and in Spain of 15 per 15 kilometers. In addition 
to their coordinates, every patch carries a variable defining the country's region and is allocated 
to the local irradiation intensity as global horizontal irradiation (GHI) derived from satellite data 
(NASA). 
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4.2.4 Scheduling and process overview 
In the following, the main procedure is presented. It is repeated after the initialization of the 
model once every month. The procedure goes through its three modules in the following order: 
(1) evaluate adoption, (2) update technological change and (3) adjust deployment policy (if the 
policy is active). The model’s simulation period runs from January 2004 for Switzerland and 
from January 1996 for Spain until December 2016 for both cases. 
4.2.4.1 Scheduling 
This thesis aims at evaluating the performance of novel policy mechanisms. Thus, in order to 
have a reference scenario to compare with and to ensure optimal data availability and accuracy 
during the analysis only past periods are modeled. However, given some future parameter 
assumptions (i.e. electricity prices, global installation capacities, etc.) the model could be used 
to forecast future developments. In general, the accuracy of a model increases with its 
simulated timeframe used for model calibration. However, the positive influence of an extended 
timeframe decreases when a time extension does not provide additional information. 
Simultaneously, longer simulation periods drive up computing times. Consequently, we start 
the simulation latest when a substantial solar PV deployment occurred in history but before the 
first FIT policy of that country came into force. 
In Switzerland the first nationwide FIT policy, named "additional costs financing" 
(Mehrkostenfinanzierung) came into force in January 2005 (Bundesamt für Energie BFE). At 
this time, total installations accounted for approximately 25 MWp, only making up 1.5% of total 
installations at the end of 2016 with around 1660 MWp. Consequently, in order to additionally 
allow for a short lead time of one year, the simulation time for Switzerland starts in January 
2004. In comparison, Spain's Electricity Sector Law was first introduced in 1997 (Law 54/1997). 
With only around 1 MWp, the installed capacity in 1997 was, compared to 4690 MWp at the 
end of 2016, negligible. Again, including a short lead time, the simulation time for Spain starts 
in January 1996. 
4.2.4.2 Process overview 
The basic algorithms of the model are based on theory and previous studies. At the beginning 
of the procedure, time-keeping and monitoring variables are adjusted. Potential adopters then 
evaluate whether they want to install solar PV or not. Afterwards, according to the already 
installed capacity, the price of solar PV systems decreases using a global experience curve 
for PV modules and a national experience curve for non-module costs. Finally, in the case of 
policy activity, the adjustment mechanism modifies the FIT of the deployment policy depending 
on the deviation to predefined policy targets. 
4.2.4.3 Consumers’ adoption decision-making 
Every actor undergoes the following decision-making process every month in order to decide 
upon the investment in a solar PV system. Following the natural process of such a decision, it 
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is implemented as consecutive steps. (a) While the first step depicts whether an actor develops 
the general idea to install PV, (b) the agent afterwards determines if it considers the investment 
economically attractive. (c) In the case of policy cost caps and a current stop for new systems 
being accepted for remuneration, the actor finally decides whether to install the system 
immediately or to postpone the investment until new remuneration is accessible. The last step 
(c) only applies to agents in Switzerland. 
4.2.4.3.1 (a) Determine project idea 
The determine project idea procedure consists of a gate keeper function that ensures that not 
all actors constantly consider a solar PV project investment. Therefore, every agent owns a 
personal degree of attraction (PDAj) that defines the agent’s affinity for a solar PV investment. 
It is modeled as a weighted linear combination of four factors: the actors' personal awareness 
of the technology (Awarenessj), the information situation with regard to solar PV (ArticlesPVt), the 
fraction of actors that have installed a PV system in the country (Peerst) and the country's 
average profitability of an investment in a solar PV system in the given month (IRRt). 
PDAj = kawareness • Awarenessj + kinfo • ArticlesPVt + kpeers • Peerst + kadvantage • IRRt > PDÂthreshold (Eq. 6) 
The indices indicate whether the factors vary over time t and/or between agents j. All four 
factors (Awarenessj, ArticlesPVt, Peerst, IRRt) take values between zero and one, and are weighted 
according to the results of the model calibration (see Chapter 4.3.1). The weights (kawareness, 
kinfo, kpeers, kadvantage) need to be greater than zero. Consequently, an agent’s personal degree of 
attraction (PDAj) also can only take on positive values. Only if an agent’s personal degree of 
attraction PDAj is greater than a certain global threshold PDÂthreshold, the agent is considered 
having the idea of a solar PV investment and proceeds to the next step (b). Consequently, if 
its personal degree of attraction is below the threshold, the agent is not considered having the 
idea in this month and undergoes the procedure starting at step (a) in the next period again. 
Given its linear dependency, the threshold PDÂthreshold is fixed to a value of 0.5. 
The PV awareness reflects the individual attitude and knowledge of the technology, triggering 
PV affine actors to enter the process earlier than PV averse consumers. This can be 
understood as a combination of factors, besides others, driven by e.g. an adopter's 
technological affinity or environmental awareness. Literature states that for certain adopters 
the interest and curiosity in solar PV being an innovative electricity generation technology 
played a key role for their investment (Schelly 2014). Additionally, interviews and surveys 
stressed environmental concerns or the reduction of the impact on the environment by using 
renewable energy sources to be very important in an adopters' decision-making processes 
(Schelly 2014 ⁠; Rai and McAndrews 2012). Each agent is assigned a constant environmental 
awareness level between zero and one, following a truncated normal distribution of mean 0.5 
and standard deviation 0.2. 
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The available information represents how much new and cumulated content on solar PV is 
accessible through news articles. In 1969, Bass (1969) already proposed a product diffusion 
model indicating the adoption process being influenced by an external effect, mainly referring 
to mass media, and an internal effect referring to word-of mouth or the neighborhood effect 
(see below). These two main types of communication channels have later been confirmed by 
Jager (2006) and Rogers (2003) and also applied in modeling solar PV adoption processes 
(Zhao et al. 2011). The available information each month is the sum of the news articles 
published that month about solar PV and the cumulative number of articles on the topic, which 
both evolve according to the deployment of solar PV in the considered country and the rest of 
the world. The functions to calculate the number of articles have equal weight and were fitted 
from empirical data on articles about solar PV in the considered country since 1990 (see 
appendix A.7). 
The peer-effect represents the proportion of adopters of solar PV within the country. The 
theoretical foundation of interpersonal communication among agents being an important 
component of an innovation's diffusion process in general was already given by Rogers (2003). 
Since then, a number of studies have shown that particularly in the diffusion of solar PV peer 
effects exist (Bollinger and Gillingham 2012 ⁠; Linder 2013 ⁠; Richter 2013 ⁠; Rai and Robinson 
2013). Even the questions of how and why peer effects influence the decision to adopt has 
been subject of recent research (Curtius et al. 2018). Besides this, most studies investigating 
the adoption of solar PV also include mechanisms to account for this characteristic (Palmer et 
al. 2015 ⁠; Robinson et al. 2013 ⁠; Zhao et al. 2011). Although researchers found out that the 
influence of this effect is often driven by the geographical proximity between agents (Islam 
2014 ⁠; Rai and McAndrews 2012 ⁠; Schelly 2014), due to computational power restraints, we 
currently depict the effect on a national basis. Defined as the fraction of actors that have 
already installed a PV system in the respective country, and thus being a global, instead of an 
agent-specific variable, it drives down model complexity and allows for shorter computation 
time. 
The perceived advantage represents the improving chances to develop the idea to adopt a 
technology as this becomes a more attractive investment. Several studies have shown the 
economic profitability being of major importance for the decision-making process of an investor 
(Islam 2014 ⁠; Rai and McAndrews 2012). The variable rests on the assumption that more 
advantageous investment options enjoy more active sharing of information about it through 
word of mouth. This is modeled by the internal rate of return of a solar PV investment for an 
average household in the respective country. 
4.2.4.3.2 (b) Determine Project Profitability 
Once an agent develops the idea to install solar PV, it evaluates whether adoption makes 
economic sense. It is implemented as a net-present-value (NPV) calculation, being a function 
of investment costs, avoided electricity purchasing costs, operation and maintenance costs, 
received revenues due to FIT payments and the guaranteed payment period for incentives and 
is calculated in the national currency (Cur.) of the considered country. 
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NPVPV [Cur.] = 
- Investment cost [Cur.] + ∑
Avoided costs [Cur./yr] - O&M costs [Cur./yr] + FIT revenues [Cur./yr]
(1 + discount rate)year
Pay. Period
year=0
 
(Eq. 7) 
In principle, every agent that has determined the potential idea of an investment undergoes 
this economic evaluation and only defines the installation to be economically attractive if its 
expected project NPV is non-negative (i.e. the internal rate of return of adopting exceeds the 
agent’s discount rate). Alternatively, residential agents (i.e. households) will install solar PV 
regardless of its economics if their environmental awareness is extraordinarily high and greater 
than a country specific and calibrated awareness threshold (Awâthreshold) (see Chapter 4.3.1). 
Surveys found out that for some adopters an interest in technical innovation and the enjoyment 
of the technical aspects of energy systems combined with environmental concerns were of 
higher importance than the economics. As a result, some of the adopters, mostly private 
individuals, even invested despite a lack of profitability for their solar PV system (Schelly 2014). 
Additionally, history proved that some early adopters pioneered the uptake of solar PV at a 
time when doing so was uneconomic. 
Given that the available information of solar PV (ArticlesPVt), the proportion of adopters in the 
country (Peerst) and the perceived advantage of the investment (IRRt) are global variables, 
agents with the highest awareness level get the idea of a potential investment first. Due to this 
strong linkage, it is ensured that high aware agents with a personal awareness above the 
threshold will install earlier in time, and before all other agents with an awareness level below 
the threshold. Consequently, the implemented exemption for households of investing despite 
missing profitability is well suited for representing the early adopters as stressed by literature 
and visible in historical data. 
However, in the case the agent’s awareness is below the threshold for early adopters, it 
considers, a project specific non-negative NPV as a precondition for the final system 
installation. The investment costs are calculated as the product of the size of the system 
(agent’s own characteristic), the price of solar PV and the scale effect. 
Investment cost [Cur.] = System size [kWp] • PV system price [Cur./kWp] • Scale effect [-] (Eq. 8) 
The scale effect reduces the price of solar PV as the system size grows larger based on 
historical observations. The scale effect is set according to a reference system of size 10 kWp 
for which the price remains unchanged (i.e. the scale effect is one). For systems smaller than 
1 kWp it is kept constant at 1.2. For systems greater than 1 kWp the scale effect is defined by 
the following function (Haelg, L., Waelchli, M. & Schmidt, T. S.): 
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Scale effect [-] = 1.1246 • System size [kWp]-0.051 (Eq. 9) 
Avoided costs derive from the avoided consumption of electricity from the grid and are a 
function of the self-consumption rate for the solar generation, the electricity price, and the solar 
electricity generation itself. Operation and maintenance costs are estimated to be around 1.5% 
of the cost of the solar system (Peters et al. 2012). 
Avoided costs [Cur./yr] = Self-consumption [-] • Solar generation [kWh/yr] • Electricity price [Cur./kWh] (Eq. 10) 
Revenues from policy incentives are a function of the FIT, the self-consumption rate for the 
solar generation, and the solar electricity generation. 
FIT revenues [EUR/yr] = (1 - Self-consumption [-]) • Solar generation [kWh/yr] • FIT0 [EUR/kWh] (Eq. 11) 
The solar electricity generation is a function of the irradiation in the location of the agent, the 
size of the system, the performance ratio (PR) (i.e. the ratio between AC output and DC 
nominal power, set at 0.85) (Fraunhofer ISE 2018), and a production factor, which accounts 
for the heterogeneity of each installation (e.g., orientation, tilt, shading). Each agent has a 
production factor randomly assigned from a normal distribution of mean 0.9 and standard 
deviation 0.2. 
Solar generation [kWh/yr] = Irradiation [kWh/kWp] • System size [kWp] • PV PR [-] • Production factor [-] (Eq. 12) 
As mentioned above, if the NPV is non-negative, the agent considers the investment to be 
attractive. If besides its attractiveness, also sufficient funds for remuneration are available in 
the given month and for the considered project, the agent installs the system. 
In Spain, if there are not sufficient remaining funds provided by the government, due to the 
policy’s deployment cap between 2009 and 2011, the agent refrains from the investment in 
this period and undergoes the whole procedure starting at step (a) in the next period again. 
In Switzerland, if there are not sufficient remaining funds provided by the government, due to 
the policy’s cost cap, the agent undergoes the following decision-making step (c). It determines 
whether to install the system in the current month without immediate remuneration or to 
postpone the investment until new funds are available. 
4.2.4.3.3 (c) Decide upon investment postponement 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.3.4, under certain circumstances an immediate installation, despite 
missing immediate remuneration, could be economically advantageous over the 
postponement of the investment. However, for similar expected returns of both options, 
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immediate investment versus investment postponement, we expect agents to postpone their 
installation to avoid the risk of an immediate investment featuring the uncertainty of future 
remuneration. This is supported by an individual's risk aversion that is a fundamental element 
in standard theories of asset valuation (Pratt 1964) and a desirable goal when it comes to 
investment decisions (Klos et al. 2005). 
Consequently, taking this into account, the agent in our model only decides for the immediate 
installation in the following cases: (i) if the expected NPV for the immediate installation is 
positive, while the expected NPV for the postponement is negative or (ii) if the expected NPV 
for the immediate investment exceeds the expected NPV for the postponement by a certain 
percentage (see Eq. 13). If one of the two requirements hold true, the agent immediately 
installs its system and registers on the waiting list in the hope of receiving remuneration for the 
already built system in the future. The threshold value of 13.6% was derived within the overall 
model calibration (see Chapter 4.3.1). 
NPVPV, immediate expected
NPVPV, postponed expected
 - 1 > NPV̂threshold (Eq. 13) 
In all other cases, the agent does not install its system in the current month. However, it also 
registers the not yet built project on the waiting list and installs its system as soon as sufficient 
funds are available and its project is released for remuneration. Although during the time 
between the registration date and the final installation date PV prices as well as FIT levels 
might have changed, the agent does not review the economic viability of its project before final 
installation. This is justified by the high bureaucratic burden for the registration process in 
history (pronovo 2018). For the sake of simplicity, the agent only has the two mentioned 
options, whose decision is taken in the same month as the initial idea generation. Installing the 
system at some point between the initial idea generation and the release of funding for the 
project is not considered as an option. 
An agent undergoing the decision process assumes to face the same waiting time as the 
adopter that so far waited the longest between project registration and final release of its 
project remuneration. New demand for the remuneration of new projects constantly exceeded 
the supply of new financial funding provided by the government throughout the years in history 
(pronovo 2018). Consequently, the registered capacity on the waiting list, as well as the 
necessary waiting time, also grew continuously.  
The expected NPV for an immediate installation(PVPV, immediate expected) but without immediate 
remuneration considers the current investment costs, the avoided electricity purchasing costs 
and the operation and maintenance costs during all years, from the current date until the end 
of the payment period. They are calculated using the same approach as in step (b) (see 
Chapter 4.2.4.3.2). The future FIT revenues are only taken into account for the shortened 
funding period, starting after the expected waiting time but again only lasting until the end of 
the payment period. 
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NPVPV, immediate expected = 
 - Inv. cost0 + ∑
Av. costs - O&M costs
(1+discount rate)year
Pay. Period
year=0
 + ∑
FIT rev0
(1+discount rate)year
Pay. Period
year=expected waiting time
 
(Eq. 14) 
The future FIT revenues are based on the current FIT level of the date of installation. 
FIT0= (1-Self-consumption) • Solar generation • FIT0 (Eq. 15) 
The expected NPV for a postponed installation (NPVPV, postponed expected) estimates the future 
investment costs and takes into account the expected future FIT revenues, starting after the 
expected waiting time but this time lasting until end of a guaranteed payment period, postponed 
by the expected waiting time. The operation and maintenance cost are estimated to be around 
1.5% of the expected cost of the solar system (Peters et al. 2012). The avoided electricity 
purchasing costs still follow the same approach as in step (b) (see Chapter 4.2.4.3.2) and are 
based on the current electricity price that is not projected into the future. 
NPVPV, postponed expected = 
- Inv. costexpected waiting time+ ∑
Av. costs - O&M costs + FIT revexpected waiting time
(1 + discount rate)year
Pay. Period + expected waiting time
year=expected waiting time
 
(Eq. 16) 
The agent estimates the future investment cost and the future FIT as a relative share of today’s 
values. Thereby, it assumes the relative change that these values have experienced over the 
duration of the expected waiting time in the recent past, to occur by the same percentage over 
the duration of the upcoming waiting time. For example, if the agent expects its waiting time to 
be 1 year and if PV prices have decrease by 10% during last year, it expects the PV prices to 
again decrease by 10% during the next year. 
Inv. costexpected waiting time = Inv. cost0 • 
Inv. cost0
Inv. cost0 - expected waiting time
 (Eq. 17) 
FIT revexpected waiting time = (1 - Self-consumption) • Solar generation • FITexpected waiting time (Eq. 18) 
FITexpected waiting time = FIT0 • 
FIT0
FIT0 - expected waiting time
 
(Eq. 19) 
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4.2.4.4 Technological learning 
The evolution of cumulative deployment in the respective country constitutes an endogenous 
output variable of the model, determined by the agents’ adoption each month. The cumulative 
installed capacity in the rest of the world is given by historical data (IEA PVPS - International 
Energy Agency 2017c). The price decrease of solar modules, following a global experience 
curve is determined by the sum of both cumulative deployments. However, the price decrease 
of non-module elements (e.g. installation, inverter, balance of system) is only defined by the 
country’s respective cumulative deployment, and thus follows a national experience curve. 
Both cases and countries are modeled using one-factor experience curves based on the 
historical price development of residential solar PV systems and solar modules in the 
respective country (IEA PVPS - International Energy Agency 2017b ⁠, 2017a). The curves are 
fitted through least squares with the errors weighted by the monthly installations. This results 
in learning rates of 22% for modules and 9% for non-module components in Spain and learning 
rates of 21% for modules and 11% for non-module components in Switzerland. 
To avoid excessive sensitivity of the experience curves, the learning effect is capped at 2% 
per month. The cap is based on an observed maximum annual price decrease of around 22% 
in Germany as a reference country with good data availability (IEA - International Energy 
Agency 2017b). 
4.2.4.5 Policy adjustment 
We study two different adjustment criteria in respect of which the mechanism calculates the 
monthly incentive adjustments: deployment – based on the capacity installed each month and 
policy costs – based on the total support costs calculated following Eq. 5. 
While historical FIT policies sometimes only waited one month between two incentive 
adjustments (Clearingstelle, EEG, KWKG 2012), the revisions of FITs normally were 
performed less frequently. For example, in the early phase of Spain's support policy, the 
revision of remuneration levels was only scheduled once every year (del Rio 2014). However, 
experience has taught policy makers that this regularity was not sufficient to react to the fast 
evolution of solar PV prices (Sijm 2002). Also previous studies found that responsive FIT 
schemes with more frequent tariff adjustments reach deployment targets most effectively 
(Zhao et al. 2011). Nevertheless, literature also agrees that adjustments should not happen 
too frequently in order provide a certain security to project investors (Kreycik et al. 2011). 
Although more frequent than monthly adjustments would most likely further increase the 
stability of policy outcomes, weekly or even daily changing FIT levels would not give potential 
adopters enough time to take reasonable economic decisions on the basis of constantly 
changing remuneration levels. 
The mechanisms employ an algorithm based on control theory principles, which calculates a 
non-predetermined modification of the FIT every month. The modification is based on the 
deviation of the policy outcome from predefined targets. The deviation is measured as the 
distance between a deployment or policy cost target and the model’s actual installed capacity 
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or policy expenditure. Deployment: the policy defines monthly policy targets and the 
mechanism responds to the evolution of the monthly installed capacity. Policy costs: the policy 
sets monthly cost objectives and the mechanism tracks how support costs (i.e. including future 
payments) evolve each month. The deviation is positive if the system falls short of the policy 
target and negative if the system exceeds it. 
According to the direction and distance of the deviation, the algorithm aims at simultaneously 
correcting the previous month’s deviation (proportional correction) and the cumulative 
deviation since the beginning of the policy (integrative correction). The sum of these two 
individual corrections then determines the adjustment of the incentive level. 
Given its reactive and automated behavior, the functional principle of the adjustment 
mechanism constitutes a major change compared to historical policy designs that attempted 
to predict the pace of technological learning or used fixed adjustments (Kreycik et al. 2011 ⁠; 
Grau 2014). For example, if we used a deployment adjustment criterion and there were a 
deviation since the beginning of the policy (excluding the previous month) of +100 MWp and 
the deviation for the previous month were -20 MWp, then, the proportional correction would be 
proportional to -20 MWp and the integrative correction would be proportional to +80 MWp. The 
resulting adjustment of the policy incentive is the sum of the two corrections scaled by their 
proportionality constants (Eq. 20). 
FIT#month = FIT#month-1 + kp • e#month-1 + ki  • ∑ et
#month-1
t=1
 (Eq. 20) 
Where e stands for the deviation between the actual and the targeted deployment or policy 
cost for the month #month. The proportionality constants kp and ki were calibrated for each 
adjustment criterion to minimize the monthly deviations (see Chapter 4.3.1). 
Within Chapter 5 we define different scenarios employing the two adjustment criteria and 
comprising different overall policy targets, different starting conditions for the policy incentives 
and different temporal distributions of targets. 
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4.3 Model and mechanism calibration 
In order to ensure the model’s accurate representation of the dynamics of solar PV adoption 
in each country and to achieve optimal results for the adjustment of incentives, the model’s 
calibration parameters as well as the mechanism’s proportionality constants need to be 
calibrated. 
4.3.1 Model calibration 
The model’s key output measure deployment is calibrated against the historical evolution of 
cumulative installed capacity in the respective country. Furthermore, given the existence of the 
waiting list for remuneration, the Swiss model is simultaneously calibrated against a second, 
artificial pattern that we define as the intended installation capacity of adopters. It is defined as 
the sum of cumulative historical deployment and the installation capacity that was registered 
on the waiting list that had not yet been installed. 
This general procedure can be referred to as "pattern oriented modeling" (Grimm et al. 2005) 
that determines the model’s calibration parameters. They are derived separately for the model 
of each country. While in Switzerland, the calibration parameters of all three steps apply, the 
Spanish model only constitutes the calibration parameters of step (a) and (b). 
In step (a), the development of the idea to install, the threshold for the agent’s personal degree 
of attraction to develop the idea to install (PDÂthreshold) is set to a value of 0.5, given its linear 
dependency. Thus, the weighing factors defining the strength of the following four influences 
on the agents’ personal degree of attraction constitute model calibration parameters: 
 the influence of the actors' personal awareness of the technology  
 kawareness 
 the influence of the information situation with regard to solar PV 
 kinfo 
 the influence of the fraction of actors that have installed a PV system in the country 
 kpeers 
 the influence of the average profitability of an investment in a solar PV system 
 kadvantage 
Step (b), the determining of the project profitability, is a purely economic evaluation without the 
need of calibration, whereas the threshold to skip the economic evaluation for highly aware 
agents constitutes a calibration parameter: 
 the awareness threshold to skip the economic evaluation    Awâthreshold 
In step (c), only relevant for the Swiss model, the threshold, determining the decision upon an 
investment postponement also constitutes a calibration parameter: 
 the threshold to decide upon the invest. postponement   NPV̂threshold  
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In a first phase, the approximate weights were estimated by trial and error, in order to find the 
general region of the values, where the modeled deployment pattern was similar to cumulative 
installed capacity in history. The final selection of weights was performed by minimizing the 
sum of the monthly deviations from historical values to the median of sets of 100 simulation 
runs (see Table 4.3). 
Since the models are based on stochastic processes (e.g., the distribution of the environmental 
awareness among agents), that generate a unique behavior for each simulation run of the 
model, we need to consider the statistical properties of a number of simulation runs to derive 
reliable conclusions. Sets of 100 model runs allowed for a statistically representative 
distribution of model outcomes for one scenario, while limiting computational requirements to 
an acceptable extent. Their median values deviate less than 5% above or below from the 
median that we would observe from a set with 1,000 simulation runs. 
Table 4.3: Model calibration parameters for Switzerland and Spain 
Country 
Step (a) 
Determine project idea 
Step (b) 
Determine Project Profitability 
Step (c) 
Decide upon investment 
postponement 
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
 
kawareness = 0.491 
kinfo = 0.089 
kpeers = 1.07 
kadvantage = 0.047 
PDÂthreshold=0.5 
Awâthreshold= 0.99
b NPV̂threshold = 0.136 
S
p
a
in
 
kawareness = 0.488 
kinfo = 0.0428 
kpeers = 0.8 
kadvantage = 0.5 
PDÂthreshold=0.5 
Awâthreshold=0.99
b - 
(a) Given the linear combination of factors within the development of the idea inequation, one factor was initially fixed; here the 
threshold for the agent’s personal degree of attraction (PDÂthreshold) to a value of 0.5. (b) This qualifies around 0.1% of all 
households to be early adopters, due to their awareness above the calibrated threshold. While in the simulated policy in 
Switzerland, 4.5% of all households adopted solar PV until 2016, only 0.13% of households in Spain adopted solar PV until 
2016. 
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Note: Simulated results are based on 1,000 simulation runs. 
Figure 4.2. Simulated and historical cumulative deployments for 2004-2016 in Switzerland 
 
 
 
Note: Simulated results are based on 1,000 simulation runs. 
Figure 4.3. Simulated and historical cumulative deployments for 1996-2016 in Spain 
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The model does not consider potential psychological influences on adoption. This could be the 
reason, why it overestimates the general deployment between 2009 and the end of 2011 in 
Spain. In Spain, economic profitability was still given for many projects in history as well as in 
the simulation after October 2008, despite the reduction of incentives. However, given the 
additional introduction of even retroactive policy measures for already existing solar PV plants, 
as a response from policy makers to the installation boom, some potential adopters might have 
experienced a loss of reliance in promised political commitments (del Rio 2014). Furthermore, 
deployment in the model experiences a sudden stop from 2012 onwards, given the moratorium 
of incentives. While deployment in history also grinds to a halt towards 2014, some installations 
were still performed after the policy’s end. The delayed completion of these laggard projects, 
whose decision and implementation might have already started before 2012, or installations 
that were decided upon without the existence of incentives, cannot be displayed by the model. 
4.3.2 Mechanism calibration 
Besides the general calibration of the model to match historical deployment, the adjustment 
mechanisms need to be calibrated. Given the control theory approach the mechanisms require 
the setting of one proportionality constant for each of the correction terms: proportional (kp) 
and integrative (ki). The values of these constants define the sensitivity of the incentive 
adjustments with regard to the model’s deviations from the policy targets in the previous month 
(proportional correction) and the cumulative deviation since the policy start (integrative 
correction). As higher values create larger corrections, the mechanism’s ability to adjust the 
policy incentives to evolving technology costs increases, while the stability of incentives 
decreases. 
As soon as the system does not precisely follow its policy targets for some time, we are facing 
a trade-off between minimizing the absolute deviations from monthly policy targets and the 
deviation from the overall policy target. Under the condition of achieving the overall policy 
target, a temporary excess of deployment can only be corrected by allowing for a consecutive 
and undesired temporary shortfall on installations (e.g. all deployment in the early years and 
zero afterwards). Thus, we opt for a compromise that allows for an approximate achievement 
of the overall policy target, while avoiding phases of extremely high or low installations and 
simultaneously trying to minimize fluctuations of incentives. 
As different countries are exposed to different contexts and residents show a different 
sensitivity to the determined factors driving adoption, each country needs a separate 
calibration of its adjustment mechanisms. In addition, depending on the applied adjustment 
criterion, deviations are measured in different units resulting in different magnitudes (e.g. 
deployment in MWp or policy costs in million EUR/CHF). Thus, each adjustment criterion also 
requires a different calibration of the adjustment mechanism. Finally, a further calibration was 
necessary for different overall targets, to align the sensitivity of incentive corrections (see Table 
4.4). 
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Table 4.4: Proportionality constants for incentive adjustment mechanisms 
Country Adjustment criterion kp ki Unit 
Switzerland 
For achievement of historical key policy outcomes 
Deployment 2.0 • 10
-4
 2.0 • 10
-6
 
[∆CHFFIT / MWpdeviation] 
Policy cost 8.0 • 10
-5
 1.0 • 10
-5
 
[∆CHFFIT / millllion CHFdeviation] 
For achievement of 500 W/capita in deploymenta 
Deployment 6.0 • 10-4 5.0 • 10-5 
[∆CHFFIT / MWpdeviation] 
Spain 
For achievement of historical key policy outcomes 
Deployment 7.0 • 10
-5
 4.0 • 10-5 
[∆EURFIT / MWpdeviation] 
Policy cost 2.0 • 10
-5
 4.0 • 10-6 
[∆EURFIT / millllion EURdeviation] 
For achievement of 500 W/capita in deploymenta 
Deploymentb 7.0 • 10
-5
 4.0 • 10-5 
[∆EURFIT / MWpdeviation] 
(a) The overall deployment goal in the second set of scenarios is aligned with the capita specific historical deployment in 
Germany in 2016 of 500 W/capita (see Chapter 5.1.2 and 5.2). (b) For Spain, the proportionality constants for the achievement 
of the historical key policy deployment outcome was also suitable for the achievement of the increased target. 
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5 Scenarios 
This thesis evaluates a novel adjustment mechanism that automatically modifies the policy 
incentives each month, namely the feed-in tariff (FIT) level, depending on the deviation from 
installation capacity or policy costs to predefined policy targets. In contrast to historical policy 
designs, the studied responsive mechanisms neither attempt to predict the pace of 
technological learning, nor use fixed adjustments. Instead, they utilize control theory principles 
to determine each month’s correction of the FIT level (La Hoz et al. 2010). 
In the first part of our analysis (1), we evaluate if the responsive adjustment mechanisms could 
have achieved a more cost-efficient policy and an increase in the policy’s effectiveness 
compared to historical policies. In the second part (2), we assess the influence of different 
policy configurations on the ability of the new policy design to accurately achieve its targets 
and test their influence on the policy’s cost efficiency. We explicitly test different overall 
deployment targets, different initial incentive conditions and a different deployment timing. 
The main model outputs of all scenarios are the diffusion of the technology (i.e. installed 
capacity of solar photovoltaics (PV)) and the policy costs (i.e. the sum of support costs for each 
adopter during 20 years of the FIT). Using these measures, we (1) compare the outcome of 
simulated policies using the new mechanisms to the simulated historical policy outcomes in 
Spain and Switzerland (see Figure 5.1 below). Then, we (2) compare different scenarios 
comprising the three mentioned variations in policy configurations among each other and with 
respect to a base scenario. In compliance with the model’s calibration, we employ the median 
outcome of 100 simulations to account for the randomness of the adoption process. 
 
Note: Values are based on model outcomes for simulated historical policies in Switzerland and Spain (for more info see 5.1.1). 
Figure 5.1. Simulated historical policy outcomes in Switzerland and Spain 
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5.1 Increasing cost efficiency and effectiveness of historical 
policies 
For our first part of the analysis (1) we start with (a) testing the mechanisms under conditions 
close to history and aim for a similar overall deployment or for similar overall policy costs as 
simulated for the historical policies. Then, given that historical conditions were not necessarily 
desirable, we (b) detach the targets for our new policy design from historical outcomes and 
aim for a higher effectiveness as achieved by historical policies, measured in cumulative 
deployment.  
5.1.1 Improving policies within historical conditions 
In order to ensure the comparability to the historical policies, our mechanism’s activity is 
restricted to the period when historical policies had a FIT with independent and fixed incentive 
levels in place. While Switzerland directly started its FIT policy with independently set 
incentives in January 2005 (Bundesamt für Energie BFE), Spain first decoupled their incentive 
levels from the average retail electricity price in January 2004. While in Switzerland the feed-
in remuneration policy was still in place at the end of 2016, Spain’s support policy for new solar 
PV systems already came to a complete moratorium in 2012 (del Rio 2014). 
We define the overall policy goals as the historical deployment or estimated policy cost and 
distribute them throughout the months that the policy is active. Additionally, for each type of 
target, deployment and policy cost, we study two temporal distributions of monthly targets: a 
linear one, resulting in a quadratic function for cumulative targets, and a logistic one, resulting 
in an s-shaped curve for cumulative targets. 
The logistic distribution of deployment targets is set to closely mimic the historical evolution of 
installations but with a smoother distribution over time, avoiding individual temporal 
deployment peaks. The peak-month of the s-curve of cumulative targets is adjusted to ensure 
that the distribution reaches 50% of its overall target at the same time as in history. Additionally, 
the steepness is set to mirror that of the historical evolution in the considered country. As an 
alternative, we further explore a linear distribution of deployment targets, being a typical 
distribution of targets defined by policy makers in history (Instituto para la Diversificación y 
Ahorro de la Energía (IDAE) 2011). For policy cost targets, the overall goal distribution is 
identical to the one for deployment targets. 
In both cases, the overall targets are set to the historical deployment and estimated policy 
costs in Spain and Switzerland for installations built until 2016. In Switzerland, cumulative 
deployment of 1.66 GWp in 2016 is rounded up to 1.7 GWp and in Spain rounded up from 4.69 
GWp to 4.7 Gwp (see Table 5.1 below). 
For the cost targets that simultaneously serve as the reference to compare the achievements 
of the new policy design with, both countries reveal some challenges regarding the definition 
of policy costs. Switzerland ended up only paying around 32% of all installations built until 
December within the expected feed-in remuneration scheme, while others were left with a 
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significantly lower one-time investment subsidy after they had already built their PV system 
(see Chapter 3.3.4) (Bundesamt für Energie BFE). Spain introduced certain policy measures 
that ex post cut the expected and promised financial support to adopters as they retroactively 
shortened the initially guaranteed eligible period for remuneration or retroactively implemented 
caps on the maximum remunerated operating hours. In both countries, these decisions 
obviously allowed to reduce the final policy costs at the investors’ expense. Instead, our new 
policy design does not offer these possibilities. It does not allow for any retroactive policy 
changes and assumes (1) all installed PV systems to be paid by the feed-in remuneration 
scheme for (2) all energy fed into the grid (3) over a 20 years period. To allow for a rather fair 
comparison, we estimate the historical policy costs a government had faced if it had applied 
the same conditions. The model estimates the historical policy costs within the historical 
simulated policy scenarios (CH-HIST* / ES-HIST, see Chapter 4.3.1 and Table 6.1) the same 
way it also calculates the policy costs for the scenarios applying the new policy design (see 
Eq. 5) 
For Spain, the historical policy costs estimated by the model (EUR 46.65 billion) only deviate 
by 5.3% from the estimated actual historical policy costs for installations built until 2016 in 
Spain based on government data (EUR 44.24 billion) (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y 
la Competencia (CNMC) 2018). Thereby we referred to “Retribución Regulada”, only 
considering the difference between the paid FIT and the wholesale electricity price as final 
policy costs (see Eq. 5). 
For Switzerland, as there is no cost data available for our considered assumptions, we refer to 
the historical policy costs estimated by the model (EUR 7.75 billion / CHF 8.6 billion). A more 
detailed discussion on this topic dealing with different approaches of how to calculate historical 
policy costs in Switzerland can be found in the Appendix (see A.10). 
Including the simulation of the historical policies and accounting for the two temporal 
distributions of deployment and policy cost targets, ten scenarios are evaluated (see Table 
5.1). Figure 5.2 shows the temporal distributions of deployment targets compared to history. 
The initial FIT at the beginning of the policy’s active period for residential adopters is set to the 
historical value: EUR 0.1 per kWh (CHF 0.15 per kWh) in January 2005 in Switzerland and 
EUR 0.4 per kWh in January 2004 in Spain. Commercial and utility-scale agents consistently 
receive a fraction of the residential FIT according to historical relations (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 5.1: Target summary – Improving policies within historical conditions 
Scenario Policy target Overall target 
Temporal distribution 
of monthly targets 
Additional 
parameters 
CH-HIST 
Historical FIT / 
Deployment 
[-] [-] [-] 
CH-DEP-L 
Deployment 1.7 GWpb 
Linear [-] 
CH-DEP-Sa Logistic 
Peak month Jul 2014, 
steepness 0.085 
CH-COST-L 
Policy cost 
EUR 7.75 billion 
(CHF 8.60 billion) 
Linear [-] 
CH-COST-Sa Logistic 
Peak month Jul 2014, 
steepness 0.085 
ES-HIST 
Historical FIT / 
Deployment 
[-] [-] [-] 
ES-DEP-L 
Deployment 4.7 GWpb 
Linear [-] 
ES-DEP-Sa Logistic 
Peak month Aug 
2008, steepness 0.3 
ES-COST-L 
Policy cost EUR 46.65 billion 
Linear [-] 
ES-COST-Sa Logistic 
Peak month Aug 
2008, steepness 0.3 
(a) The logistic distribution of monthly targets results in the evolution of cumulative deployment or policy costs following an s-
curve, which is why mechanisms using this distribution are referred to with ‘-S’. (b) Watt peak (Wp) is a measure unit of electrical 
power that refers to the nominal power output of a solar PV device under standard test conditions. (c) To allow for a better 
comparison, results are generally displayed in EUR. However, the policy cost targets for the Swiss model are defined in CHF, 
given that the model is running in CHF. 
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Note: Given the step in the cumulative deployment curve in Spain, the steepness of the target curve was set to most accurately 
represent the major uptake of deployment around 2008. 
Figure 5.2. Target distribution – Improving policies within historical conditions  
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5.1.2 Increasing effectiveness of historical policies 
We study scenarios that evaluate if the responsive adjustment mechanism could have ensured 
a higher effectiveness of policy outcomes than in history (see Table 5.2). We set a consistent 
active period that runs from January 2005 to December 2016 in both Switzerland and Spain to 
reduce the influence of a different policy timing on the effectiveness of the policy. 
We take Germany as a reference case being the most effective country in terms of installed 
capacity per capita. We test if the new policy design could have made other countries equally 
effective and evaluate how this would have affected the policy’s cost efficiency. We set the 
overall deployment target to a value for each country that would ensure a specific effectiveness 
per capita of 500 W, comparable to the one in Germany in 2016. The distribution of targets 
also imitates the historical deployment distribution in Germany between 2000 and 2016. We 
consider a logistic distribution of deployment with the peak month of installations after 65% of 
the policy’s active period and a steepness for the s-curve of 0.07. The initial FIT in January 
2005 is automatically calculated by the model to ensure an internal return rate of 0% for the 
solar PV investment of an average residential agent in the respective country. Figure 5.3 shows 
the resulting distribution of deployment targets over time compared to history. 
Table 5.2. Target summary – Increasing effectiveness of historical policies 
Scenario Policy Deployment Target Initial FITb Additional parameters 
Base Scenario 
Capacity per capita as in DE 
2016 (500 W/capita) 
FIT starting value for 
profitability indifference 
Similar goal distribution as 
deployment in history in DE 
CH-BASE 4’100 MW IRR = 0% 
Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 
ES-BASE 23’200 MW IRR = 0% 
Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 
 
  
Figure 5.3. Target distribution – Increasing effectiveness of historical policies 
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5.2 Evaluating influence of overall policy targets, initial incentives 
and deployment timing 
In our second part of the analysis we explore how much the configuration of the policy – overall 
deployment targets, initial incentive levels, deployment timing – hinders or facilitates achieving 
a more effective or cost-efficient policy than in the base scenario (see Figure 5.4 and Table 
5.3). 
First, we increase and decrease the overall deployment target by ±20%, while keeping the 
initial incentive conditions to a level that on average ensures a 0% internal return rate for 
residential adopters, the peak month in November 2012 and the steepness of the s-curve for 
cumulative deployment to 0.07. 
Second, while keeping the overall deployment target to the values of the base-scenarios, we 
increase and decrease the initial incentive conditions to a level that on average ensures an 
initial internal return rate of ±2% for residential adopters. The distribution of targets remains 
the same. 
Third, while keeping the overall deployment target to the values of the base-scenarios and the 
initial incentive conditions, we modify the distribution of deployment targets by shifting the peak 
month and accordingly adjust the steepness of the s-curve. For simulating an earlier 
deployment, monthly installations already peak after 50% of the policy’s active period, in 
January 2011, while for a later deployment, monthly installations only peak after 80% of the 
policy’s active period, in August 2014. In order to still achieve the overall deployment targets 
within the given period, the steepness of the s-curve for a later deployment is increased to 0.09 
and the steepness for an earlier deployment accordingly decreased to 0.05. 
  
Figure 5.4. Target distribution – Influence of policy targets, initial incentives and timing 
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Table 5.3: Target summary – Influence of policy targets, initial incentives and timing 
Scenario Policy Deployment Target Initial FIT Additional parameters 
Base Scenarioa 
Capacity per capita as in DE 
2016 
(500 W/capita) 
FIT starting value for 
profitability indifference 
Similar goal distribution as 
deployment in history in DE 
CH-BASEa 4’100 MW IRR = 0% 
Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 
ES-BASEa 23’200 MW IRR = 0% 
Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 
Effectiveness 
Evaluation 
±20% change in capacity per 
capita 
(600 W/capita 
400 W/capita) 
FIT starting value for 
profitability indifference 
Similar goal distribution as 
deployment in history in DE 
CH-EFF-UP 4’900 MW 
IRR = 0% 
Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 CH-EFF-DOWN 3’300 MW 
ES-EFF-UP 27’800 MW 
IRR = 0% 
Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 ES-EFF-DOWN 18’600 MW 
Starting 
Conditions 
Evaluation 
Capacity per capita as in DE 
2016 
(500 W/capita) 
FIT starting value for 
deviating average 
internal return rate 
Similar goal distribution as 
deployment in history in DE 
CH-STC-UP 
4’100 MW 
IRR = +2% Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 CH-STC-DOWN IRR = -2% 
ES-STC-UP 
23’200 MW 
IRR = +2% Peak month Nov 2012, 
steepness 0.07 ES-STC-DOWN IRR = -2% 
Timing 
Evaluation 
Capacity per capita as in DE 
2016 
(500 W/capita) 
FIT starting value for 
profitability indifference 
±15% change in peak month, 
±0.02 change in steepness 
CH-TIC-LATE 
4’100 MW IRR = 0% 
Peak month Aug 2014, 
steepness 0.09 
CH-TIC-EARLY 
Peak month Jan 2011, 
steepness 0.05 
ES-TIC-LATE 
23’200 MW IRR = 0% 
Peak month Aug 2014, 
steepness 0.09 
ES-TIC-EARLY 
Peak month Jan 2011, 
steepness 0.05 
(a) While the BASE-scenarios have already been analyzed within phase one they are still listed here as they serve as a 
reference. 
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6 Results 
This chapter first presents the results from part 1 of the analysis (see Chapter 6.1), followed 
by the results from part 2 of the analysis (see Chapter 6.2). The results are generally based 
on the median values of 100 model runs, as this has also been the criteria used for the model 
calibration to account for the randomness of the adoption process. The Swiss model is running 
in CHF to ensure that adopters are also taking the investment decisions in their national 
currency. However, the resulting costs of the model are all converted into EUR to allow for a 
better comparison across countries. The policy costs that are generally allocated to the month 
of adoption are converted by the monthly historical exchange rate of the corresponding month 
(boerse.de). 
6.1 Increasing cost efficiency and effectiveness of historical 
policies 
6.1.1 Improving policies within historical conditions 
In both countries, all adjustment mechanisms, whether following deployment or policy cost 
goals and whether distributing targets linearly or logistically, successfully steer adoption 
towards the historical deployment and policy cost with a deviation of less than 10% from their 
policy targets. Apart from the linear distribution of targets in Spain, they all manage to improve 
the certainty about policy outcomes over the simulated historical policy (see Table 6.1). 
In Switzerland, all adjustment mechanisms manage to increase largely and even double the 
cost efficiency of the simulated historical policy (i.e. at a lower policy cost per unit of installed 
capacity). Due to the removal of the overall deployment limit, the mechanisms following cost 
targets even achieve a doubling of historical deployment in Switzerland without increasing the 
simulated historical policy costs. In Spain, mechanisms with linearly distributed policy targets 
manage to reach their goals more cost-efficiently than the simulated historical policy. In 
contrast, the logistic distributions of targets show lower cost efficiencies than the simulated 
historical scenario. 
Thus, deployment policies using the analyzed adjustment mechanisms tend to achieve their 
targets more reliably than the simulated historical policies. However, doing so more cost-
efficiently would depend on the formulation and distribution of the policy targets and the country 
they are applied in. 
Table 6.1 shows the median effectiveness and cost efficiency of each scenario and the 
simulated historical policies. The overview allows us to evaluate the relative change of these 
key values for policies using the suggested new responsive policy design compared to 
simulated historical outcomes. Figure 6.2 shows the temporal evolutions of the median feed-
in tariff (FIT) and annual installations for each scenario in each country. They compare 
adjusting incentives to deployment or policy cost targets distributed linearly (DEP-L, COST-L) 
or logistically (DEP-S, COST-S). 
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Table 6.1: Key policy outcomes – Improving policies within historical conditions 
Scenario 
Total Installed Capacity 
(median) 
[GWp] 
Total Policy Cost 
(median) 
[bn EUR] 
Policy Cost Efficiency 
(median) 
[Wp / EUR] 
CH-HIST* 
1.66 
(-0.3,+2.2) 
7.75 
(-1.19,+3.05) 
0.21 
(-0.02,+0.01) 
CH-DEP-L 
1.84 
(-0.05,+0.06) 
3.97 
(-0.15,+0.14) 
0.46 
(-0.01,+0.01) 
CH-DEP-S 
1.76 
(-0.06,+0.06) 
3.9 
(-0.28,+0.29) 
0.45 
(-0.03,+0.02) 
CH-COST-L 
3.37 
(-0.13,+0.15) 
7.28 
(-0.08,+0.19) 
0.46 
(-0.01,+0.02) 
CH-COST-S 
3.77 
(-0.13,+0.2) 
7.55 
(-0.06,+0.13) 
0.50 
(-0.01,+0.02) 
ES-HIST 
4.79 
(-0.9,+1.3) 
46.65 
(-9.6,+14.2) 
0.10 
(-0.004,+0.004) 
ES-DEP-L 
4.79 
(-0.6,+2.1) 
39.92 
(-1.9,+6.5) 
0.12 
(-0.01,+0.03) 
ES-DEP-S 
5.12 
(-0.2,+0.7) 
64.15 
(-2.9,+9.6) 
0.08 
(-0.004,+0.003) 
ES-COST-L 
7.58 
(-1.0,+4.6) 
48.94 
(-3.6,+18.1) 
0.16 
(-0.01,+0.03) 
ES-COST-S 
4.16 
(-0.3,+0.6) 
50.40 
(-1.9,+10.5) 
0.08 
(-0.005,+0.004) 
Note: The median value from 100 simulations is reported together with the distance to the upper and lower boundaries of the 
interval around the median covering 90% of the simulations. The mean of each policy outcome of each mechanism in standard 
letters is statistically different from the simulated historical scenario (CH-HIST* / ES-HIST) with a confidence level exceeding 
99.999% according to a two-tailed t-test robust to heteroskedaticity. The confidence level for values in italics is 95% or higher 
and for underlined values between 60% and 85%. 
 
Figure 6.1. Effectiveness-efficiency – Improving policies within historical conditions   
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Distributing policy targets logistically – matching the historical evolution of deployment 
In Switzerland, both logistic distributions of policy targets (CH-DEP-S / CH-COST-S) more than 
double the simulated historical cost efficiency (CH-HIST*). They manage to steer deployment 
to the overall goal with significantly lower FIT levels than in history throughout the entire policy 
period (see Figure 6.2, top). Given the removal for the overall deployment limit, the scenario 
containing a logistic distribution of cost targets (CH-COST-S) even manages to more than 
double deployment with similar costs compared to the simulated historical policy. Thereby, it 
also achieves a higher cost efficiency than the scenario with logistically distributed deployment 
targets (CH-DEP-S). 
In contrast, mimicking the historical boom and bust cycle of deployment in Spain fails to 
increase the cost efficiency of the simulated policy (ES-HIST). This applies to deployment 
targets as well as to policy cost targets (ES-DEP-S / ES-COST-S). Due to cumulative policy 
targets following a strict s-curve, the mechanisms even aim at achieving an earlier deployment 
of the historical installations that occurred after 2009 (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 6.2, bottom). 
Targeting a different evolution of deployment than history by distributing goals linearly 
In Switzerland, the mechanisms with a linear distribution of targets (CH-DEP-L / CH-COST-L), 
whether following deployment or cost targets, both manage to double the simulated historical 
cost efficiency of the policy (CH-HIST*). Again, given the removal for the overall deployment 
limit, the scenario with a linear distribution of cost targets (CH-COST-L) even manages to more 
than double deployment with similar costs compared to the simulated historical policy. Yet, 
despite the removal in the deployment restriction, the scenario with a linear distribution of cost 
targets (CH-COST-L) cannot outperform the linear distribution of deployment targets (CH-
DEP-L) as it experiences a temporary overshoot in adoption (see Figure 6.2, top). 
In Spain, both linear distributions (ES-DEP-L / ES-COST-L) of policy targets allow for an 
increase in cost efficiency compared to history because they ensure a more even distribution 
of monthly deployment targets. Additionally, they allow for a temporal shift of average 
installations to a later period, confronting adopters with lower solar photovoltaic (PV) prices. 
This allows for deployment at lower incentive levels (see Figure 6.2, bottom left). Given the 
removal for the overall deployment limit, the scenario with linearly increasing cost targets (ES-
COST-L) even outperforms the scenario with linearly increasing deployment targets as it 
achieves a higher effectiveness, as well as an increase in efficiency. 
While the new policy designs manage to achieve the set targets in Spain already within the 
first years, it does not manage to foster deployment in Switzerland in the early years at all. 
Starting at a relatively low incentive level of only 0.1 EUR/kWh (0.15 CHF/kWh) in 2005, the 
adjustment mechanism requires a certain time until the first installations are built in 
Switzerland. A further investigation of the impact of different initial incentive levels is performed 
in the second part of our analysis (see Chapter 6.2.2).  
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Switzerland 
Deployment Targets Cost Targets 
  
Spain 
Deployment Targets Cost Targets 
  
Note: The left Figures compare the median FITs, annual installed capacities and deployment targets of the designs using a deployment 
adjustment criterion, with linear (CH-DEP-L / ES-DEP-L) and logistic (CH-DEP-S / ES-DEP-S) distributions of targets to the historical 
policy scenarios (CH-HIST / ES-HIST). The Figures on the right compare the median FITs and annual installed capacities of the designs 
using a policy cost adjustment criterion, with linear (CH-COST-L / ES-COST-L) and logistic (CH-COST-S / ES-COST-S) distributions 
of targets to the historical policy scenario (CH-HIST / ES-HIST). 
Figure 6.2. Temporal evolutions – Improving policies within historical conditions  
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The results show that the novel adjustment designs are able to steer adoption to the defined 
targets. While in Switzerland this can be achieved with a relatively low volatility of incentives 
over time, the mechanisms in Spain need to introduce sudden and large changes in the FIT 
(see Figure 6.3). This effect is a peculiarity of the Spanish market. Going into the details of the 
simulations, one can observe that deployment tends to boom mainly driven by just a few 
relatively big installations. This complies with the occurrences in history. In contrast to other 
countries characterized by a high share of residential and roof-mounted systems, 98% of the 
installed capacity of solar PV in Spain consists of ground-mounted large-scale systems (ASIF 
- Asociación de la industria fotovoltaica 2009). 
  
Note: (1) The analysis of incentive fluctuations in Switzerland refers to CHF, being the currency a Swiss investor would be 
looking at. The incentives converted into EUR would create fluctuations due to the changing exchange rate, which would distort 
the message of this figure. (2) The scaling of agents in the model artificially strengthens the effect of just a few big PV systems 
already explaining a large installation boom. For example, if one agent with a 1 MWp PV system belongs to an agent type 
group scaled by the factor 10, this one agent in the model represents 10 investors in reality. Instead of possibly having one of 
those investors each month getting the idea to install in reality, the model would on average only simulate one idea every 10 
months as there are 10 times less agents of this agent type in the model than in reality. However, every 10 months this one 
investment then accounts for 10 installations in reality. Thus, instead of having 1 MWp of deployment every month, the model 
simulates 10 MWp of deployment but only every 10 months. Consequently, the model overestimates the fluctuations in 
incentives driven by large installations compared to how distinct they would appear in reality under the use of the new policy 
design.  
Figure 6.3. Incentive fluctuations for individual simulation runs 
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6.1.2 Increasing effectiveness of historical policies 
In both countries, Switzerland and Spain, the responsive adjustment mechanism successfully 
achieves a similar capita specific effectiveness as the historical policy in Germany (see Table 
6.2 and Figure 6.4). While it allows to make the Spanish policy nearly as cost-efficient as the 
estimated historical German one, Switzerland can achieve an even more cost-efficient policy 
than in Germany. 
While in Switzerland the mechanism accurately achieves the defined deployment goal, it 
exceeds its target by nearly 10% in Spain. In Switzerland, despite shifting the average 
installation dates of deployment to earlier periods than in history, the mechanism still achieves 
an 80% higher cost efficiency than the simulated historical policy (CH-HIST*). However, given 
the increase in effectiveness of around 160% from 1.6 GWp in history to 4.16 GWp, the 
simulated historical policy costs increase by 35% from EUR 7.75 billion in the historical 
simulation to EUR 10.5 billion. 
In Spain, the mechanism more than doubles the cost efficiency compared to the simulated 
historical policy from 0.1 Wp/EUR to 0.21 Wp/EUR. It fosters deployment especially between 
2012 and 2016, a period when the solar PV market in history was more or less stagnating in 
Spain (see Figure 6.5, incl. note). Given the efficiency increase, an effectiveness increase of 
more than 400% from 4.7 GWp in history to 25.3 GWp can be achieved with policy costs only 
rising by around 150% from EUR 46.65 billion in history to EUR 120 billion. 
Table 6.2. Key policy outcomes – Increasing effectiveness of historical policies 
Scenario 
Total Installed Capacity 
(median) 
[GWp] 
Total Policy Cost 
(median) 
[bn EUR] 
Policy Cost Efficiency 
(median) 
[Wp / EUR] 
CH-BASE 
4.16 
(-0.02,+0.02) 
10.52 
(-0.44,+0.77) 
0.38 
(-0.09,+0.03) 
ES-BASE 
25.30 
(-2.4,+5.2) 
120.00 
(-15.9,+28) 
0.21 
(-0.02,+0.03) 
Note: The median value from 100 simulations is reported together with the distance to the upper and lower boundaries of the 
interval around the median covering 90% of the simulations. 
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Note: The graph shows the median from 100 simulations. 
Figure 6.4. Effectiveness-efficiency – Increasing effectiveness of historical policies 
  
Note: Given the high fluctuations in the FIT level and accordingly in the deployment in Spain, the median values distort the 
evolutions at first sight. Although from 2014-2016 the FIT for the median is at 0 EUR/kWh and does not display any deployment, 
incentives were temporary above 0 EUR/kWh and deployment did occur as visible in the mean values. 
Figure 6.5. Temporal evolutions – Increasing effectiveness of historical policies  
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6.2 Evaluating influence of overall policy targets, initial incentives 
and deployment timing 
Table 6.3. Key policy outcomes - Influence of policy targets, initial incentives and timing 
Scenario 
Total Installed Capacity 
(median) 
[GWp] 
Total Policy Cost 
(median) 
[bn EUR] 
Policy Cost Efficiency 
(median) 
[Wp / EUR] 
CH-BASE 
4.16 
(-0.02,+0.02) 
10.52 
(-0.44,+0.77) 
0.38 
(-0.09,+0.03) 
ES-BASE 
25.30 
(-2.4,+5.2) 
120.00 
(-15.9,+28) 
0.21 
(-0.02,+0.03) 
CH-EFF-UP 
4.96 
(-0.02,+0.07) 
12.67 
(-0.7,+1.01) 
0.38 
(-0.1,+0.03) 
CH-EFF-DOWN 
3.36 
(-0.01,+0.03) 
8.60 
(-0.29,+0.43) 
0.38 
(-0.09,+0.02) 
ES-EFF-UP 
31.04 
(-3.5,+5) 
149.5 
(-18.5,+36.5) 
0.20 
(-0.02,+0.02) 
ES-EFF-DOWN 
19.96 
(-1.8,+4.2) 
90.30 
(-13.1,+23.6) 
0.22 
(-0.02,+0.02) 
CH-STC-UP 
4.16 
(-0.02,+0.03) 
11.04 
(-0.52,+0.72) 
0.36 
(-0.09,+0.03) 
CH-STC-DOWN 
4.16 
(-0.02,+0.02) 
10.32 
(-0.47,+0.42) 
0.39 
(-0.09,+0.03) 
ES-STC-UP 
25.57 
(-2.8,+4.7) 
120.50 
(-15.5,+26.4) 
0.21 
(-0.01,+0.02) 
ES-STC-DOWN 
24.98 
(-2.2,+5.7) 
120.50 
(-17.4,+25.5) 
0.21 
(-0.02,+0.02) 
CH-TIC-LATE 
4.18 
(-0.04,+0.29) 
8.39 
(-0.22,+0.31) 
0.49 
(-0.1,+0.02) 
CH- TIC-EARLY 
4.86 
(-0.75,+1.44) 
44.46 
(-10.45,+12.2) 
0.1 
(-0.04,+0.03) 
ES-TIC-LATE 
26.43 
(-3.8,+10.2) 
121.00 
(-26.7,+48.9) 
0.23 
(-0.04,+0.03) 
ES-TIC-EARLY 
24.80 
(-1.9,+3.0) 
163.00 
(-15.0,+17.9) 
0.15 
(-0.01,+0.01) 
Note: The median value from 100 simulations is reported together with the distance to the upper and lower boundaries of the 
interval around the median covering 90% of the simulations. The mean of each policy outcome in standard letters is statistically 
different from the base scenario (CH-BASE / ES-BASE) with a confidence level exceeding 99.999% according to a two-tailed 
t-test robust to heteroskedaticity. The confidence level for values in italics is 95% or higher and for underlined values between 
60% and 85%. 
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6.2.1 Evaluating the influence of different overall targets 
Similar to the previous scenarios, the responsive adjustment mechanism accurately achieves 
different deployment targets in Switzerland, while it tends to exceed the overall targets in Spain 
by around 10%. In Spain, the absolute, as well as the relative overshoot increases with more 
ambitious goals. In both cases, different overall deployment targets do not compromise policy 
efficiency and remain relatively constant at 0.38 Wp/EUR in Switzerland and 0.21 Wp/EUR in 
Spain (see Table 6.3 and Figure 6.6). 
In both countries, the mechanism accurately ensures the incentive differences required to 
achieve different overall deployment goals. Visually apparent in Figure 6.6, the differences in 
the FIT across scenarios are more distinct in Switzerland. While the median FIT between 
higher and lower overall deployment targets in Switzerland experiences a temporary gap of up 
to 0.1 EUR/kWh, incentives in Spain do not separate more than 0.02 EUR/kWh across 
scenarios (see Figure 6.6, right). 
In the early years, the results show higher deployment generally requiring higher incentives. 
For the late years, this does not hold true and one can even see higher deployment despite 
lower incentives for scenarios with more ambitious goals compared to those with less 
ambitious goals. Reflected by the crossing of FIT evolutions over time, the scenario ensuring 
more early installations can profit more from market adjustments afterwards. Higher 
deployment in an initial policy phase allows for a better utilization of especially national 
technological learning, driving down investment costs and enhancing the presence of the 
technology for future adopters in later years (see Figure 6.6, right). The model takes this into 
account within the learning curve for the technology, the information effect and the peer-effect, 
driven by either cumulative installed capacity or the number of installations. 
In general, for all three policy configurations the reliability of policy outcomes is much higher in 
Switzerland than in Spain. While the key policy outcomes, overall deployment and overall 
policy cost, of all 100 simulation runs end up within a quite narrow range in Switzerland, the 
results in Spain show a significantly more scattered picture (see Figure 6.6, Figure 6.7 and 
Figure 6.8, left).  
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Switzerland 
 
 
 
Spain 
  
Figure 6.6. Comparison of total installed capacity and total policy costs and temporal evolutions 
of scenarios – Evaluation of different overall deployment targets  
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6.2.2 Evaluating the influence of initial incentive conditions 
Owing to the responsive adjustment mechanism, different initial incentive conditions do not 
appear to have a significant influence on the overall final deployment. While in Switzerland the 
mechanism accurately achieves the overall deployment goal, in Spain, independently of the 
initial incentive levels, it exceeds the goal to the same extent as in the Base-scenario (see 
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.7). 
While there is also no significant difference regarding policy efficiency between scenarios in 
Spain, the studied different initial incentive conditions do only have little influence on policy 
efficiency in Switzerland. Within the studied scenarios, the responsive mechanism proves the 
ability to deal with different initial incentive levels for equal policy targets by adjusting them in 
an early policy stage and to ensure a unified evolution of tariffs across scenarios afterwards. 
Switzerland 
  
Spain 
  
Figure 6.7. Comparison of total installed capacity and total policy costs and temporal evolutions 
of scenarios – Evaluation of different initial incentive conditions  
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6.2.3 Evaluating the influence of deployment timing 
Except for the scenario of an early deployment in Switzerland, the responsive mechanism 
manages to steer the markets for different deployment timings to the defined goals with a 
similar accuracy as in the base scenario. Moreover, a later deployment generally offers cost 
reductions and thus an increase in the policy’s cost efficiency (see Table 6.3 and Figure 6.8). 
In Switzerland, trying to keep up with the targeted fast adoption ramp-up for an early 
deployment (CH-TIC-EARLY), the mechanism sharply drives up the incentives. However, 
diffusion misses the policy targets and incentives increase further. After still falling short on the 
targets for a couple of years, the market eventually experiences a severe adoption overshoot. 
By then, incentives have already reached a level where the responsive mechanism is not 
anymore able to take countermeasures fast enough in order to bring the market back under 
control (see Figure 6.8, top right). Consequently, given the temporarily high incentives 
especially during the adoption boom, policy costs escalate and the policy efficiency collapses 
from 0.38 Wp/EUR in the base scenario (CH-BASE) down to 0.1 Wp/EUR. In contrast, an initial 
raise of incentive levels by around 0.1 EUR/kWh in Spain (ES-TIC-EARLY) is already sufficient 
to foster the increased targeted adoption in the early policy phase (see Figure 6.8, bottom 
right). Nevertheless, the necessary increase of incentives expectedly reduces the policy’s cost 
efficiency significantly from 0.21 Wp/EUR in the base scenario (ES-BASE) down to 0.15 
Wp/EUR. 
While a later targeted deployment generally offers the possibility of cost reductions across all 
scenarios, the extent to which the cost efficiency of policies can be increased varies. In 
Switzerland, the postponement of deployment (CH-TIC-LATE) allows to foster the majority of 
installations after incentives have experienced a distinctive drop around 2010. Simultaneously, 
incentives in the late years do not require to be much higher as in the base scenario (CH-
BASE) in order to still achieve more ambitious deployment targets. This allows for an increase 
of 29% in the policy’s cost efficiency from 0.38 Wp/EUR in the base scenario up to 0.49 
Wp/EUR. In contrast, incentives require to be significantly higher than in the base scenario 
(ES-BASE) in order to ensure high deployment in the late years in Spain (ES-TIC-LATE). Thus, 
the cost efficiency can only be increased by around 10% from 0.21 Wp/EUR in the base 
scenario up to 0.23 Wp/EUR, although the majority of deployment is shifted to later times. 
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Switzerland 
    
Spain 
  
Figure 6.8. Comparison of total installed capacity and total policy costs and temporal evolutions 
of scenarios – Evaluation of different deployment timing 
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7 Discussion 
This study reveals how a new design for adjusting incentives can prevent low solar photovoltaic 
(PV) deployment achieved by historical policies in Switzerland and Spain. Simultaneously, it 
can significantly reduce the costs per installed capacity compared to the simulated historical 
policies. 
First, the results show that adjusting incentives according to more evenly distributed policy 
targets can curb the historically occurred boom and bust cycles in Spain and can achieve more 
cost-efficient deployment policies. By distributing policy cost targets linearly (ES-COST-L), 
Spain could have increased its overall deployment of 4.79 GWp solar PV by an additional 2.8 
GWp (+58%) while only spending EUR 2.2 billion (+5%) more than in the simulated historical 
policy scenario (ES-HIST) (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1). In contrast, the new designs do not 
achieve cost reductions by trying to mirror the extreme and undesired historical evolution of 
installations in Spain, characterized by a short adoption surge, instantly followed by a 
deployment collapse. Thus, for appropriately defined targets, the designs reveal a novel 
approach of how to tackle the major issue of an uncontrolled and sudden boom in adoption, 
historically present in countries such as Italy or the Czech Republic (see Figure 10.1, A.1). 
Second, the new policy design can accurately steer a market that in history was regulated by 
policy cost caps, only by offering a suitable level of feed-in tariffs (FITs) and without using 
additional measures. In Switzerland, for logistically distributed deployment targets (CH-DEP-
S), the new mechanism manages to more than double the cost efficiency of the simulated 
historical policy from 0.21 Wp/EUR (CH-HIST*) to 0.45 Wp/EUR (see Table 6.1 and Figure 
6.1). By offering consistently lower incentives, it achieves a similar deployment of 1.76 GWp, 
while only spending 50% of the simulated historical costs. Rephrased, despite a reduction in 
incentives, policy makers in Switzerland could have ensured an even higher deployment as in 
history without exceeding their provided financial support. Hence, continuously met policy caps 
indicate unnecessarily generous incentive levels. Additionally, the new design could make the 
use of policy caps under certain conditions generally dispensable, avoiding their drawbacks of 
possibly arising cost inefficiencies and a limited access to funds for investors. 
Third (see Chapter 6.1.2), the novel policy design accurately achieves different predefined 
policy goals and can reliably increase the effectiveness and cost efficiency of simulated 
historical policies. This enables policy makers to define their final policy goals in advance while 
handing over the adjustment of incentives to the novel mechanisms without being concerned 
about escalating costs. Using the new design, Switzerland and Spain could have both 
achieved a similar deployment of around 500 Wp/capita as Germany until 2016. It furthermore 
would have allowed the Spanish policy to become nearly as cost-efficient and the Swiss policy 
to become even more cost-efficient than the estimated German one (see Figure 6.4). For a 
logistic distribution of deployment targets, Switzerland (CH-BASE) could have installed 4.16 
GWp (+150%) for total policy costs of EUR 10.52 billion (+35%). Spain (ES-BASE) could have 
achieved an overall deployment of 25.3 GWp (+430%) for total policy costs of EUR 120 billion 
(+157%), doubling the simulated historical cost efficiency (ES-HIST) from 0.1 Wp/EUR to 0.21 
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Wp/EUR (see Table 6.2). Applied in new deployment policies, the novel design could thus 
ensure the rapid spread of future key technologies in order to address the issue of climate 
change effectively while cost-efficiently. 
A further analysis of scenarios revealed (1) the distinct tendency of more cost-efficient policies 
when deployment targets focus on later years, even when using the responsive adjustment 
mechanisms. However, the novel design manages to strongly (2) limit the influence of different 
initial incentive conditions and (3) different overall deployment targets on the obtained policy 
efficiency as well as on the accuracy of achieving the predefined overall policy targets. 
First (see Chapter 6.2.3), the results show that higher deployment targets in later years 
generally offer the possibility for cost reductions. However, the financial benefits of a later 
diffusion become particularly present if a certain exploitation of early market developments is 
ensured. A later deployment that shifts the peak month from November 2012 nearly two years 
ahead to August 2014 (CH-TIC-LATE) increases the cost efficiency of the base scenario in 
Switzerland (CH-BASE) by 29% from 0.38 Wp/EUR to 0.49 Wp/EUR. However, the study 
reveals the cost efficiency increase of a later deployment in Spain (ES-TIC-LATE) to only 
account for 10% compared to the base scenario (ES-BASE) from 0.21 Wp/EUR to 0.23 
Wp/EUR. The benefits of e.g. national technological learning were limited in the Spanish 
scenario, given that deployment was not effectively fostered in the early years. However, 
delaying installations can undermine the environmental benefits of deploying renewable 
technologies, despite the increase in the cost efficiency of the policies. While the later 
deployment in Spain (ES-TIC-LATE) allows for an increase in cost efficiency of 10% compared 
to the base scenario (ES-BASE), it misses out on 27% of avoided CO2-equivalent emissions 
from other electricity generation sources until 2016 (see Table 10.4 in A.12). 
Depending on the conditions the responsive adjustment mechanism is applied in, the novel 
design either manages or fails to ensure a fast adoption ramp-up for an early deployment. 
While the Spanish market responds relatively sensitively and almost instantly to a small rise in 
the FIT, the Swiss market misses high initial policy targets even for fairly generous incentive 
levels. Thus, the mechanism provides the ability to adjust incentives in a suitable way in order 
to steer the market accordingly, if a market itself allows for a quick and strong immediate 
uptake with reasonable incentive levels. However, the responsive mechanisms cannot steer 
adoption single-handedly towards the policy targets by only adjusting the incentives, if non-
economic barriers (e.g. scarce information) in a market do not allow for such an uptake, despite 
high financial returns. In the latter, when non-economic barriers weaken, the high incentives 
eventually might induce a surge in installations as the technology becomes better known and 
adopters start influencing their neighbors. Along with the discussed difficulties of a fast 
adoption ramp-up for an early deployment from the demand side, the realizability from a supply 
perspective might create an additional bottleneck. The fast and widespread diffusion of a 
technology that is quite new in a national market requires a timely development of a specific 
industry to provide infrastructure enabling such an abrupt market uptake, e.g. PV hardware 
supply and installers. 
 
7 Discussion 
 
65 
 
 
 
Especially for the support of new technologies, policy makers should keep in mind that forcing 
a too fast adoption ramp-up bears risks, as the market might not be able to keep up with the 
fast pace. However, a continuous postponement of renewable deployment due to cost 
advantages misses its actual purpose of achieving environmental objectives. Instead, an early 
introduction of support with responsive policy adjustments and moderately increasing 
deployment targets over time minimizes the risk of uncontrollable adoption and ensures timely 
environmental benefits. 
Second (see Chapter 6.2.2), within the tested spectrum, the mechanism shows the ability to 
overcome the issue of how to set the initial incentive level, a concern that policy makers, not 
being able to refer to historical experiences, faced often. With the novel policy design, it 
becomes less critical to introduce the right level of incentives as they get automatically 
adjusted, which could make governments more likely to apply deployment policies in the future. 
However, initiating a policy with too cautiously set incentives, far below a level that could make 
an investment for adopters profitable, risks to lead to a start-up time with no deployment. 
Depending on the settings of the mechanisms, the adjustment towards suitable incentives 
would require a certain time until the targeted adoption occurs. Eventually, as the policy has 
fallen short on its targets for some time, policy makers would have to allow the adoption to 
exceed the defined targets in the later years in order to still achieve the overall goal. 
Alternatively, trying to make up for the deficit in initial deployment, a temporary but drastic 
overshoot could occur deteriorating the policy’s cost efficiency (see Figure 6.2, top right). 
Third (see Chapter 6.2.1), the results show that different overall deployment targets can be 
accurately achieved and do not necessarily compromise the costs per installed capacity when 
using the responsive mechanisms. This demonstrates the potential of the new design to avoid 
future deployment policies similarly missing their intended targets as in history (Kreycik et al. 
2011 ⁠; del Rio 2014 ⁠; Ragwitz et al. 2011). Simultaneously, from a policy cost efficiency view, 
the results show that policy makers should not be afraid of setting ambitious goals. 
Overall, the results show that the novel adjustment designs are able to steer adoption to the 
defined targets in Spain but only by introducing sudden, large changes in the FIT as a response 
to occasionally coinciding installations of big plants (see Figure 6.3). This tendency complies 
with historical occurrences. Spain experienced over 70% of its deployment until October 2008 
in just six months, making the pattern for cumulative installations resemble one big step 
function that abruptly stopped by the drastic incentive cuts and the introduction of deployment 
caps. While the new policy design cannot satisfyingly overcome this issue, it allows to smooth 
these effects and to reduce the size of the steps without using additional measures such as 
caps but by ensuring a faster adjustment of incentives than in history. However, this missing 
consistency in incentive levels might discourage adoption as it inhibits the planning security 
for project investors whose project implementation might exceed the qualifying period between 
two adjustments of one month. The findings still reveal the need to further refine the 
mechanism for such extreme cases. A possible solution approach could be the uncoupling of 
utility-scale adopters and the residential market by setting independent incentives for different 
system sizes, combined with deployment caps for utility-scale systems. 
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8 Limitations 
This study has several limitations that offer promising avenues for future research: First, the 
model is limited with regard to how it was calibrated. Optimally, it would be validated against 
data not used for calibration. However, given the recursive working principle of the adoption 
process, influenced by the evolution of previous periods, one cannot just use a random subset 
of data for calibration. Instead, one would need to validate the outcome of later periods against 
the calibration of earlier periods. As technological diffusion is a process of emergence, 
consulting a shorter time span as used for the calibration in order to leave room for validation 
data would reduce its accuracy. Since the availability of historical data for the adoption of solar 
photovoltaics (PV) is limited, a possible validation can only be done in the near future. 
Second, the model is built on a number of simplifications and assumptions, mainly due to the 
lack of empirical data. The main simplifications are (a) the limited representation of adoption 
decision-making, (b) the missing consideration of inertia and expectations about technology 
prices or policy incentives and (c) the limited representation of technological change. 
(a) The model designs a unitary decision-making process that is primarily based on literature 
findings tailored for private adopters, while industrial investors might follow a different and more 
economically driven approach. Moreover, by modeling a time invariant adoption, the model 
cannot represent a change in decision rationales of investors over time. However, especially 
in Switzerland interviews with the local PV industry revealed a growth in environmental 
awareness driving the decision for an adoption, sometimes even defying economic rationality 
(Rottmann 5/9/2018b ⁠, 5/9/2018a). Yet, the model only takes this bounded rationality for some 
early adoptions into account. Due to limited data, the environmental awareness of potential 
adopters is assumed to be distributed in the same manner in Switzerland and Spain, despite 
indications that this may not be accurate. (b) Moreover, the model does not account for inertia. 
Any changes in the market are immediately taken into consideration by potential adopters that 
implement their decision by immediately building a solar PV system, neglecting any 
construction times. In addition, expectations about future technology prices and policy 
incentives may impact the timing of the adoption of the technology. Although historical 
incentive adjustments in reality have sometimes even been performed on a monthly basis, the 
influence of such regular adjustments regarding the required planning security of investors 
remains unclear. (c) Furthermore, the model is limited in the detail at which it represents 
technological change. The experience curve of a technology may evolve differently under 
alternative policy designs and deployment patterns and might experience sudden changes due 
to unexpected external influences. 
Third, the model is suspiciously sensitive to changes in the weighting factors for the idea 
generation of adoption. Small value changes generate strong changes in diffusion (see A.9). 
Fourth, the study is limited in its technological scope to solar PV. While it overcomes the issue 
of how the new policy designs perform under different conditions, the transferability of findings 
to other technologies e.g. energy storage or electric mobility, remains obscure. 
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9 Conclusion 
This study reveals how a novel design for adjusting incentives can prevent low effectiveness 
deployment policies in different countries, while simultaneously increasing the policies’ cost 
efficiency. The new mechanisms achieve more ambitious solar photovoltaic (PV) deployment 
targets in Switzerland and Spain while significantly reducing the costs per installed capacity 
compared to the simulated historical policies in each country. While a later deployment favors 
more cost-efficient policies, different overall deployment targets as well as different initial 
incentive levels do not compromise the policy’s cost efficiency when using the studied policy 
design. 
The analyzed adjustment mechanisms use an algorithm based on control theory principles, 
which calculates a non-predetermined modification of the policy incentives every month based 
on the deviation of the policy from predefined policy targets. In an attempt to represent the 
complex diffusion process of solar photovoltaics under the influence of changing incentives, 
this study implements an agent-based model (ABM) for both Switzerland and Spain. It 
incorporates individual decision-making based on: economic profitability, environmental and 
technical considerations, the available information situation on solar PV, and the impact of 
social interactions. The model manages to reproduce historical deployment patterns during the 
2004-2016 period in Switzerland and the 1996-2016 period in Spain by simulating each 
country’s historical policy. 
In Spain, the results show that by adjusting incentives according to linearly distributed policy 
cost targets (ES-COST-L), which avoids the historically boom-and-bust installations cycle, a 
60% higher cost efficiency could have been achieved compared to the simulated historical 
policy. In Switzerland, a market that was subject to policy cost caps, the adjustment 
mechanism proves to accurately steer solar PV adoption towards the historical deployment, 
exclusively by setting a feed-in tariff (FIT) consistently lower than in history. In addition, the 
new design manages to achieve a similar specific deployment of around 500 Wp per capita as 
in Germany in 2016 for both countries, if the overall deployment goals are set accordingly. 
Moreover, the mechanism achieves that level of deployment in Spain at a similar cost efficiency 
as estimated for Germany, while being more cost-efficient in Switzerland. 
The results show that delayed deployment targets tend to lower policy costs. Additionally, they 
reveal that an unnaturally rapid and forced deployment ramp-up for early installations risks an 
adoption overshoot that deteriorates the policy’s cost efficiency. However, the new 
mechanisms reduce the importance of setting the right initial level of incentives by 
subsequently adjusting them accordingly. Finally, the new design allows to accurately achieve 
different deployment targets without compromising the cost efficiency of the policy. 
The novel design reconfirms its ability to improve upon the simulated historical policies. From 
a policy cost efficiency view, the results show that policy makers should not be afraid of setting 
ambitious deployment goals when using the new mechanisms. The novel design could thus 
ensure the rapid spread of future key technologies in order to address the issue of climate 
change without becoming too costly. Under certain conditions, the new mechanisms could 
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make the use of policy deployment or cost caps dispensable as they offer a new approach of 
how to tackle the major issue of an uncontrolled and sudden boom in adoption. As it becomes 
less critical to introduce the right level of incentives, the novel policy design could make 
governments more likely to apply deployment policies in the future. 
Beyond the limitation in the degree of detail regarding technological change and adoption 
decision-making, implementations of the new policy design targeting other technologies offer 
a promising avenue for future research. This is particularly interesting, as the methodology 
offers the possibility to inform the design of future deployment policies, e.g. in the field of 
energy storage or electric mobility. 
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V Appendix  
 Values for historical policy performances across countries  
Table 10.1. Sources for values used in policy assessment across countries 
Country Installation 
Capacitya 
Feed-in tariffb Wholesale electricity 
prices 
 
Germany 
(IEA PVPS - 
International Energy 
Agency 2017c) 
(Bundesnetzagentur 2018) (EPEX SPOT SE 2018) 
 
Italy 
(Instituto Nazionale 
di Economia Agraria 
2013) 
(MSE 2005 2005) (MSE 2007 2007) 
(MSE 2010 2010) (MSE 2011 2011) 
(MSE 2012 2012) 
(GSE Gestore Servizi 
Energetici) 
 
Great Britaina 
(Pearce and Slade 
2018) 
(Pearce and Slade 2018) (NORD POOL 2018) 
 
France 
(IEA PVPS - 
International Energy 
Agency 2017c) 
(HESPUL 2018) (EPEX SPOT SE 2018) 
 
Spain (del Rio 2014) (del Rio 2014) 
(OMIE - Operador del 
Mercado Ibérico de 
Energía - Polo Español 
2018) 
 
Czech 
Republic 
(IEA PVPS - 
International Energy 
Agency 2017c) 
(Energy Regulatory Office 2018) (pxe 2018) 
 
Switzerland 
(Bundesamt für 
Energie BFE) 
(Bundesamt für Energie BFE) (EPEX SPOT SE 2018) 
 
Austria (OeMAG) (OeMAG) (EPEX SPOT SE 2018) 
 
(a) If available within the source, monthly data was taken for the calculation of policy costs for the efficiency criterion defined 
in Chapter 3.3.2. Otherwise, yearly data was uniformly distributed across the months for each year. (b) If available within 
the installation data, the monthly policy cost was separately calculated for different categories of solar PV systems. 
Otherwise one average FIT for all installations of that month was taken that was weighted by the proportion of each system 
category on the total installed capacity (see Figure 10.1). 
 
The solar capacity factors, displaying the average expected produced energy with a solar 
photovoltaic (PV) system, are, apart from the Swiss value (pronovo 2018) taken from the 
(European Comission 2016). The discount rate employed to bring future costs of the policy 
supports to the month of adoption is represented by the interest rate of government long-term 
interest rates for all countries from the (OECD 2018). 
Figure 10.15 on the following page shows the evolution of the capita specific annual installed 
solar PV capacity in [MWp/capita] and the evolution of the average FIT level in several 
countries between 1992 and 2016.  
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Note: The displayed FIT level presents the average FIT payed to solar PV adopters in each year and country. It is weighted by the 
proportion of each system category on the total installed capacity, considered by the policy in the given year, and the according FIT 
level of the category. 
Figure 10.1: Historical deployment and feed-in tariff patterns over time across countries  
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 Qualitative evaluation of historical policies 
GERMANY: 
The German feed-in tariff (FIT) system for solar photovoltaic (PV) power is famous for being a 
highly effective and widely copied policy instrument targeted at fostering the diffusion and 
development of renewable energy technologies. Despite short periods of excess remuneration, 
windfall profits for the PV industry, the general criticism of too high costs for the society and 
the responsibility for rising electricity prices, it is overall considered a successful policy (Lesser 
and Su 2008, p. 984 ⁠; Hoppmann et al. 2014a, p. 1426). 
ITALY: 
Due to high costs for its support program, Italy introduced a register for new PV systems in 
2011 to put a cap on the amount of support granted to PV systems. Furthermore, the support 
scheme in 2012 already aimed at quickly decreasing the level of the feed-in payments , since 
grid parity was reached around 2011 (Palmer et al. 2015). Some people argue, that overall the 
confused Italian energy policy is responsible for the collapse of the PV market in Italy since 
July 2013 (Di Dio et al. 2015, p. 101). 
CZECH REPUBLIC: 
As a result of favorable market conditions, supported by a decline in solar PV prices and a 
slow reaction of policy makers, the Czech Republic became the country with the fourth largest 
newly installed solar PV capacity in 2010. Therefore, several changes were introduced that 
significantly deteriorated market conditions. A windfall profit tax of 26% on FITs was imposed 
at the end of 2009, followed by a complete stop of FIT payments for solar PV from 2014 
onwards. These policy adjustments, being the response to the escalating costs of the support 
scheme, created a lack of policy consistency and strong yearly fluctuations in installations 
(European Environment Agency 2014a, p. 3). 
FRANCE: 
Besides the main support mechanism, the FIT scheme, France offers a broad range of direct 
and indirect support policies for solar PV installations, such as capital subsidies, income tax 
credits or special green mortgages, promoting PV. Apart from slight modifications in its policy, 
such as the elimination of FIT support for non-building mounted PV systems in 2016, the 
support policy of France has not risen that much attention in the recent past (IEA PVPS - 
International Energy Agency 2016). 
GREAT BRITAIN: 
In October 2011, the government of Great Britain announced the reduction of FIT levels by 
more than 50% from 12 December 2011. However, due to a challenge by Friends of the Earth 
and two PV installers, a high court ruling prohibited such a drastic cut in FIT levels with only a 
few weeks’ notice. Consequently, the FIT was reinstated at a higher level and upheld until 
March 2012. In general, the number of solar PV installations was predicted to reach 780’000 
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by 2020 but already exceeded this number in 2016 (Pearce and Slade 2018). As a result, and 
following the UK general election, the FIT scheme was paused from 15 January to 8 February 
2016. After this interruption, deployment caps were introduced to limit installations (Ofgem 
2016). 
AUSTRIA: 
In Austria, the support schemes for solar PV have shown some discontinuity. They were more 
or less continuously under discussion and experienced a yearly change, which allows private 
users and investors only short time planning. However, compared to other countries, the 
support policy of Austria has not risen that much attention in the recent past beyond its national 
borders (University of applied sciences (FH Technikum Wien) 2016). 
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 Historical solar photovoltaic installations data 
The model refers to historical solar photovoltaic (PV) installations data for Switzerland 
(Bundesamt für Energie BFE) and for Spain (del Rio 2014), as well as for the rest of the world 
from the perspective of each country (IEA PVPS - International Energy Agency 2017c). In order 
to derive the data for the rest of the world we subtract Switzerland’s or Spain’s cumulative 
installed capacity respectively from the world’s total. 
To transform yearly data into monthly data, the yearly installation capacity is linearly distributed 
for each of the year’s month within each year from 1991 to 2016 for world data and uniformly 
distributed from 1991 to 2005 for Switzerland’s data and from 1991 to 2006 for Spain’s data. 
From 2006 onwards monthly data for Switzerland is estimated based on the registered 
installations within the KEV (pronovo 2018). From 2007 onwards monthly data for Spain is 
adopted from previous literature (del Rio 2014). 
The linear distribution determines the installed capacity each month so that the sum of all 
months of one year equals the installed capacity that year and the slope of the linear 
distribution approximates the slope of the exponential curve described by the yearly data. For 
example, if in a certain year around 12 GWp were installed, instead of distributing them 
uniformly among the twelve months of the year (12 ÷ 12 = 1 GWp), the linear distribution 
allocates installations mimicking the growth in installations observed in the yearly data, that 
could exemplary result in lower installations in January than in December. This approach helps 
avoiding large jumps from one year to another. 
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 Solar photovoltaic experience curves 
The experience curve used in the model is fitted using the historical prices and cumulative 
installation capacity in Switzerland (IEA PVPS - International Energy Agency 2017b) and Spain 
(IEA PVPS - International Energy Agency 2017a) through least squares with the errors 
weighted by the monthly installations. While deteriorating the fitting for early years, this 
approach improves the fitting of the experience curve for the years where large amounts of 
solar photovoltaics (PV) were installed. The results provide a learning rate for modules of 
21.08% in Switzerland and 21.99% in Spain and for all other elements of 11.4% in Switzerland 
and 9.2% in Spain. 
The historical solar PV prices are calculated as being composed of module prices and prices 
for all other elements. The distribution of costs between module and other costs evolve over 
time: in Switzerland as well as Spain from 65% of the price determined by modules in 1991 to 
just 40% in 2016 following the historical development observed in the data (IEA PVPS - 
International Energy Agency 2017b ⁠, 2017a). 
Values of years that are not given in the historical data are linearly extrapolated from closest 
existing yearly data points. To transform the yearly data into monthly data, the missing data 
points are linear extrapolations from their closest available data points. To allow some monthly 
variability in prices, each monthly price is allowed to fluctuate randomly by ±3% from the value 
of the linear extrapolation. 
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Figure 10.2. Fitted experience curves to historical solar PV prices in Switzerland 
 
 
 
Note: Values in red are estimated PV system prices. Data based on (IEA PVPS - International Energy Agency 2017b). 
Figure 10.3. Historical solar PV price evolution in Switzerland for 1991-2016 
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Figure 10.4. Fitted experience curves to historical solar PV prices in Spain 
 
 
 
Note: Values in red are estimated PV system prices. Data based on (IEA PVPS - International Energy Agency 2017a). 
Figure 10.5. Historical solar PV price evolution in Spain for 1991-2016
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 Electricity rates and wholesale electricity market price 
For Switzerland, between January 1991 and April 2000, monthly electricity prices for 
residential agents (including all taxes and levis) are linearly extrapolated from annual data. 
From June 2000 until December 2016 there is monthly data available (Bundesamt für Statistik). 
Monthly electricity prices for commercial (i.e. 150 MWh/a, max. 60 kW) and utility-scale agents 
(i.e. 1500 MWh/a, max. 430 kW) (excluding VAT and other recoverable taxes and levies) from 
January 1991 until April 1993 are extrapolated into earlier times by using the value of April 
1993 and the residential electricity prices as a proxy for the relative change of prices over time. 
Between May 1993 and December 2016 there is monthly data available (Bundesamt für 
Statistik). 
For Spain, monthly electricity prices for residential agents (including all taxes and levis) as well 
as for commercial (160 MWh/a, max. 100 kW) and utility-scale agents (2000-20000 MWh/a) 
are linearly extrapolated from biannual data for the whole period between 1991 and 2016 
(Eurostat). 
Between 1992 and 2016, the wholesale electricity price paid to solar generators is estimated 
as the average yearly day-ahead-auction wholesale electricity price between 11 am and 4 pm 
in each country, representing the time for sun peak hours (EPEX SPOT SE ⁠; OMIE - Operador 
del Mercado Ibérico de Energía - Polo Español 2018). Finally, between 2017 and 2045, the 
wholesale electricity prices are assumed to increase annually by 1.5% (Peters et al. 2012). 
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Figure 10.6. Electricity prices for potential adopters and wholesale electricity market prices for 
solar electricity in Switzerland 
 
 
 
Figure 10.7. Electricity prices for potential adopters and wholesale electricity market prices for 
solar electricity in Spain 
  
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
El
e
ct
ri
ci
ty
 p
ri
ce
 [
C
H
F/
kW
h
]
Residential electricity price
Commercial electricity price
Utility-scale electricity price
Wholesale electricity market
price for solar electricity
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
El
e
ct
ri
ci
ty
 p
ri
ce
 [
EU
R
/k
W
h
]
Residential electricity price
Commercial electricity price
Utility-scale electricity price
Wholesale electricity market
price for solar electricity
V Appendix 
 
93 
 
 
 
 Discount rates and bonds 
The discount rate for each agent type is represented by the historical cost of capital for different 
individuals and corporations in Switzerland and Spain. 
In Switzerland, the discount rate of agents is represented by the historical average lending 
rates for fixed-interest investment loans and a credit amount of 50’000 – 100’000 CHF for 
residential agents, 100’000 – 500’000 CHF for commercial and industrial agents and 1 million 
– 5 million CHF for utility-scale agents (SNB - Schweizer Nationalbank 2018). 
In Spain, the discount rate of agents is represented by historical average lending rates for 
consumer credits and other loans with a duration of more than five years. Residential agents 
are estimated by referring to values for households, commercial and industrial agents by 
referring to values for small and medium-sized enterprises and utility-scale agents by referring 
to values for non-financial cooperations (BDE - Banco de España). 
The discount rate employed to bring future costs of the policy supports to the month of adoption 
is represented by the interest rate of Swiss and Spanish government long-term interest rates 
(OECD 2018). 
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Figure 10.8. Evolution of discount rates for each type of agent and the discount rate for policy 
costs calculations in Switzerland 
 
 
 
Figure 10.9. Evolution of discount rates for each type of agent and the discount rate for policy 
costs calculations in Spain  
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 Information on solar photovoltaics 
For the available information and media attention to solar photovoltaics (PV), the number of 
news articles on solar PV is used as a proxy. The historical evolution of news articles on solar 
PV is based on the number of articles matching the following search of keywords in the 
LexisNexis database for international as well as Swiss or Spanish media outlets: 
Switzerland 
“solar photovoltaics” OR "solar PV" OR "photovoltaic" OR "sonnenenergie" OR "sonnenkraft" OR "solarenergie" 
Spain 
"solar photovoltaics" OR "solar PV" OR "photovoltaic" OR "energía solar" OR "energía del sol" OR "energía fotovoltaica" 
The news articles on solar PV are normalized using the maximum number of articles published 
(1088 articles in 2012 in Switzerland and 3299 articles in 2016 in Spain). Although the number 
of news articles published each month in Switzerland decreased after 2012, in the following 
years, the variable is kept constant at one as it represents how readily available news articles 
on solar PV are. Thus, we argue that the availability of articles on solar PV can get saturated 
but not decrease. The cumulative articles on solar PV are normalized by the maximum value 
of the series (8,484 articles in 2016 in Switzerland and 27,961 articles in 2016 in Spain). The 
normalized curves are fitted to a logistic function using least square errors. The information 
variable used in the model is a combination of functions with equal weight. 
Switzerland  
New articles [0,1] = -174.30 + 
175.31
1 + exp(-3.46 • 10-5 • Cumulative installed capacity in the world - 5.15)
 
(Eq. 21) 
Cumulative articles [0,1] = -154.20 + 
155.24
1+exp(-9.19 • 10-6 • Cumulative installed capacity in the world - 5.01)
 
(Eq. 22) 
Spain  
New articles [0,1] = -501.91 + 
502.77
1+exp(-8.21 • 10-5 • Cumulative installed capacity in the world - 6.30)
 
(Eq. 23) 
Cumulative articles [0,1] = -154.20 + 
155.24
1+exp(-9.19 • 10-6 • Cumulative installed capacity in the world - 5.01)
 
(Eq. 24) 
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Figure 10.10. Evolution of number of new and cumulative articles on solar PV for Switzerland 
and cumulative installed capacity in the world. Data collected from LexisNexis 
 
 
Figure 10.11. Evolution of number of new and cumulative articles on solar PV for Spain and 
cumulative installed capacity in the world. Data collected from LexisNexis  
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 Scale effect on solar photovoltaic prices 
Larger solar photovoltaic (PV) systems benefit from substantial economies of scale, mainly 
associated with the costs of inverters, installation, and balance of system elements. This effect 
has been widely studied before (Ossenbrink 2017 ⁠; Haelg, L., Waelchli, M. & Schmidt, T. S.). 
We apply the results from Haelg et. al. (forthcoming) who used a log linear regression of the 
relation between the system size and the system price for Germany and assume a similar 
scale effect in Switzerland and Spain. After comparing the relation with other references 
(Ossenbrink 2017), we adopted it after shifting it to make the scale effect one for systems of 
10 kWp, used as a reference for the price of solar PV. Due to the power form of the scale 
effects, it grew excessively large for values closer to zero. Thus, a fixed scale effect of 1.2 is 
used to approximate the scale effect on system sizes below 1 kWp. 
Scale effect = 1.1246∙System size [kWp]-0.051  
 
Figure 10.12. Economies of scale for solar photovoltaic systems 
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 Model robustness check results 
Table 10.2. Robustness check results of model calibration parameters  
Country 
Calibration 
parameter 
Final 
parameter 
setting 
Parameter 
variation by 
-10% 
Cumulative 
capacity in 
Dec 2016 
[GWp] 
Parameter 
variation by 
+10% 
Cumulative 
capacity in 
Dec 2016 
[GWp] 
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
 
Final 
parameter 
settingsa 
  1.6049  1.6049 
kawareness 0.0491 0.04419 
3.1584 
(-80.32%) 
0.05401 
3.4860 
(+117.21%) 
kinfo 0.089 0.0801 
1.4374 
(-10.43%) 
0.0979 
1.9285 
(+20.17%) 
kpeers 1.07 0.963 
1.4598 
(-9.04%) 
1.177 
1.8550 
(+15.59%) 
kadvantage 0.047 0.0423 
1.6186 
(+0.85%) 
0.0517 
1.6392 
(+2.14%) 
Awâthreshold 0.99 0.891 
1.673 
(+0.83%) 
1.089 
1.5567 
(-6.23%) 
NPV̂threshold 0.136 0.1224 
1.6300 
(+1.57%) 
0.1496 
1.5780 
(-1.67%) 
S
p
a
in
 
Final 
parameter 
settingsa 
  4.7872  4.7872 
kawareness 0.488 0.4392 
0.0010 
(-99.98%) 
0.5368 
870.1983 
(+18077%) 
kinfo 0.0428 0.03852 
3.9097 
(-18.33%) 
0.04708 
5.7128 
(+19.33%) 
kpeers 0.8 0.72 
4.6694 
(-2.46%) 
0.88 
4.7110 
(-1.59%) 
kadvantage 0.5 0.45 
3805.8 
(-20.50%) 
0.55 
5469.5 
(14.25%) 
Awâthreshold 0.99 0.891 
4760.2 
(-0.56%) 
1.089 
4617.05 
(-3.55%) 
Note: Each individual calibration parameter variation was performed for 100 simulation runs and with all other calibration 
parameters kept constant at their final value from the initial calibration. (a) The cumulative capacity for the final parameter 
settings of the initial calibration step with 1000 simulation runs serve as the reference values for the parameter variations. 
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 Discussion on historical Policy Costs in Switzerland 
In Switzerland, given the policy’s complexity and missing clarity of policy costs, we differentiate 
between three cost approaches (see Table 10.3 and Figure 10.13). CH-HIST2016: policy costs 
for granted payments in 2016. CH-HISTexp.: actually expected final policy costs for all 
installations until the end of 2016. CH-HIST*: estimated policy costs if all historical installations 
until 2016 had received the announced feed-in remuneration for the entire guaranteed 
payment period and from the date of their installation on. CH-HIST* is the one we consider to 
be the fairest comparison to how the new policy design performs, which is why it is chosen as 
a reference scenarios in this Thesis. 
CH-HIST2016: This approach only takes into account payments to installations that already had 
gotten a confirmation of remuneration by the end of 2016. Every adopter that got accepted 
within the compensation program was granted remuneration for 25 years if its system was 
installed until the end of 2013 and for 20 years if its system was installed afterwards 
(Bundesamt für Energie BFE). Consequently, these payments include both remuneration for 
already produced energy by the end of 2016 and remuneration for future energy production 
that falls into the guaranteed remuneration period of the respective adopters. 
As a reference for this scenario, historical policy cost data, only including the KEV payments 
for installations until December 2016, is available. With an estimated policy costs of CHF 2.58 
billion based on government data (pronovo 2018), our simulated policy costs from the model 
for CH- HIST2016 of CHF 2.55 billion (see Table 10.3) not even deviate by 2%. 
CH-HISTexp.: This approach extends CH-HIST2016 by including expected retroactive one-time 
investment subsidies (within the EIV) to all installations that were already built before the end 
of 2016 but still had been registered on the waiting list without having received and financial 
support yet. In 2017, no new financial resources for the initial remuneration design were 
provided by the government and no new adopters were accepted in the scheme. Additionally, 
at the beginning of 2018 the initial design of the feed-in policy came to its final moratorium. 
Instead, the Swiss government retroactively started to pay one-time investment subsidies as 
a compensation to the initially expected feed-in tariffs (FITs) to adopters. However, this only 
comprised a part of the total payments an adopter would have received in the form of a feed-
in remuneration over the years. Although at times of this study not all payments had already 
been performed, it is expected that in the near future all adopters that had installed their solar 
photovoltaic (PV) system until the end of 2016 will have received this compensation 
(Bundesamt für Energie BFE). 
CH-HIST*: This calculation is the one considered for comparison in the thesis. It displays an 
approach where all historical installations that were built until the end of 2016 in Switzerland 
would have received the announced feed-in remuneration for their entire guaranteed payment 
period and from the date of their installation on. Here, only systems that actually were installed 
in history are considered. A historical scenario without limitations in the number of adopters 
that could get accepted for the feed-in remuneration most likely would have experienced a 
further increase in the number of installations. However, this has not been analyzed.  
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Table 10.3. Discussion on historical policy costs in Switzerland 
Scenario 
Total Installed Capacity 
(median) 
[GWp] 
Total Policy Cost 
(median) 
[bn] 
Policy Cost Efficiency 
(median) 
[Wp / EUR] 
CH-HIST2016 
1.66 
(-0.3,+2.2) 
EUR 2.23 
(-0.2,+0.8) 
(CHF 2.55) 
 
0.74 
(-0.16,+0.78) 
CH-HISTexp. 
1.66 
(-0.3,+2.2) 
EUR 3.29 
(-0.47,+2.28) 
(CHF 3.76) 
 
0.52 
(-0.09,+0.17) 
CH-HIST* 
1.66 
(-0.3,+2.2) 
EUR 7.75 
(-1.19,+3.05) 
(CHF 8.6) 
 
0.21 
(-0.02,+0.01) 
Note: The median value from 100 simulations is reported together with the distance to the upper and lower boundaries of the 
interval around the median covering 90% of the simulations. The mean of each policy outcome of each mechanism in standard 
letters is statistically different from the historical scenario (CH-HISTexp. / ES-HIST) with a confidence level exceeding 99.999% 
according to a two-tailed t-test robust to heteroskedaticity. The confidence level for values in italics is 95% or higher and for 
underlined values between 60% and 85%. 
 
 
Note: These values are based on model outcomes for simulated historical policies in Switzerland and Spain.  
Figure 10.13. Effectiveness-efficiency mapping - Discussion on historical policy costs 
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All tested adjustment mechanisms (CH-DEP-S / CH-DEP-L / CH-COST-S / CH-COST-L) 
would have nearly doubled the cost efficiency compared to the scenario where all historical 
installations until the end of 2016 in Switzerland would have received the announced feed-in 
remuneration for the entire guaranteed payment period and from the date of their installation 
on (CH-HIST*) (see discussion in Thesis). 
Instead, compared to a scenario that only takes into account payments to installations that 
already had gotten a confirmation of remuneration by the end of 2016 (CH-HIST2016) the new 
policy designs obviously fails to increase the cost efficiency. Here it competes against a 
scenario that has seen most of its installations not having received any financial support yet. 
However, our mechanism only shows a slightly less cost-efficient policy, if one compares it to 
the actually expected final policy costs the Swiss government will probably be facing for 
installations performed until the end of 2016 (CH-HISTexp.). This means, that the novel 
responsive mechanisms could have e.g. achieved a similar deployment as in history while 
simultaneously keeping policy costs at bay without the use of additional policy measures such 
as policy cost caps as used in history. Additionally it would have ensured a fairer distribution 
of funds as it had remunerated all adopters based on the same and coherent feed-in policy 
design. 
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 Improving policies within historical conditions – reliability 
of policy outcomes 
Figure 10.14 and Figure 10.15 compare the distributions of total installed capacities and policy 
costs across scenarios. The results show that the certainty about the outcomes of future 
deployment policies could greatly improve by adjusting incentives using a responsive 
mechanism based on control theory in Switzerland and Spain. 
In both countries, adjusting incentives according to deployment or policy cost targets produces 
policies that deviate only slightly from their diffusion or policy cost goals. The outcomes derive 
from simultaneously correcting the monthly and cumulated deviations to predefined policy 
targets. In short, they result from estimating the incentive adjustment each month using control 
theory principles. The manual ad hoc adjustments of incentives in history, temporary combined 
with flexible degressions in Spain (HIST) produce the most scattered policy outcomes in both 
countries. 
 
Note: Distribution of total installed capacity in GWp (left) and total policy cost in billions of EUR (right) of the 100 simulation 
runs conducted for each adjustment mechanism design in Switzerland. 
Figure 10.14. Reliability of policy outcomes, Switzerland – Improving policies within historical 
conditions 
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Note: Distribution of total installed capacity in GWp (left) and total policy cost in billions of EUR (right) of the 100 simulation 
runs conducted for each adjustment mechanism design in Spain. 
Figure 10.15. Reliability of policy outcomes, Spain – Improving policies within historical 
conditions 
  
104  V Appendix 
 
 Evaluating influence of deployment timing – Ecological 
assessment of results 
Besides the economic aspects, considered within the cost efficiency criterion, the influence of 
our three policy configurations (different timing, effectiveness and initial incentive conditions) 
on ecological aspects requires further investigation. The widespread diffusion of renewable 
energies is generally motivated by their positive impact on the environment, often measured 
in emission reductions, explicitly in saved amounts of CO2 equivalents. While our analyses 
especially showed a shift in deployment to later times offering the possibility of cost reductions, 
postponed installations simultaneously miss out on early emission reductions (see Table 10.4). 
Table 10.4. Ecological emission savings – Evaluating the influence of deployment timing 
Scenario Additional emissions savings compared to BASE-scenarioa (tonnes CO2eq) 
 until 2016 until 2020 until 2030 
ES-EFF-UP +13‘720‘578 (+19.85%) +26‘205‘269 (+21.10%) +57‘416‘997 (+21.93%) 
ES-EFF-DOWN -14‘789‘946b (-21.39%) -26‘425‘888 (-21.28%) -55‘515‘744 (-21.20%) 
ES-TIC-LATE -18‘977‘331 (-27.45%) -16‘519‘974 (-13.30%) -10‘376‘582 (-3.96%) 
ES-TIC-EARLY +20‘698‘874 (+29.94%) +19‘607‘283 (+15.79%) +16‘878‘307 (+6.45%) 
CH-EFF-UP +452‘771 (+18.90%) +823‘333 (+19.19%) +1‘749‘736 (+19.39%) 
CH-EFF-DOWN -442‘802 (-18.49%) -802‘068 (-18.70%) -1‘700‘233 (-18.84%) 
CH-TIC-LATE -675‘065 (-28.18%) -656‘455 (-15.30%) -609‘928 (-6.76%) 
CH-TIC-EARLYc +1‘674‘341 (+69.90%) +1‘992‘337 (+46.44%) +2‘787‘328 (+30.88%) 
Note: Scenarios evaluating different initial incentive conditions are not listed as they do not significantly differ from the base 
case with regard to the average installation date and thus do not have a relevant impact on different emission savings. (a) 
Values are calculated based on average electricity-specific CO2 equivalent emission factors for grid electricity (ES: 320 g-
CO2eq/kWhel (Subdirección General de Planificación Energética y Seguimiento 2016), CH: 120.87 g-CO2eq/kWhel (Bundesamt 
für Energie BFE)), annual yields of 950 kWhel/kWp in Switzerland (Bundesamt für Energie BFE) and 1700 kWhel/kWp in Spain 
(Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) 2018) and assume the technological lifetime for all solar PV 
systems built until 2016 to last until 2030. (b) Negative values indicate the amount of CO2 equivalent emissions in tonnes less 
saved than in the BASE-scenario. (c) Note, that the cumulative installed capacity for the CH-TIC-EARLY scenario exceeds the 
one from the CH-BASE scenario, as the policy significantly misses its target, which influences the values for saved emissions 
overproportionately. 
While the scenario of a later deployment in Spain (ES-TIC-LATE) allows for an increase in cost 
efficiency of 10% it misses out on 27% of reduced emissions until 2016 and still on 13% of 
emission reductions until 2020 compared to the base scenario (ES-BASE). A change in overall 
deployment targets that keep the average date of installation constant across scenarios, 
obviously allow for consistently more or less saved emissions in the order of their target 
differences, here around ±20%. 
